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NOTE 
 
LONG LIVE THE KING: UNITED 
STATES v. BAGDASARIAN AND THE 
SUBJECTIVE-INTENT STANDARD FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL “TRUE-THREAT” 
JURISPRUDENCE 
KYLE A. MABE* 
 
[A]s President of our country, and Commander-in-Chief of our 
military, I accept that people are going to call me awful things every day, 
and I will always defend their right to do so. 
 
—PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA1 
INTRODUCTION 
A man named Walter Walker once owned an inn named The 
Crown.2  One day he said to his son, “Tom, if thou behavest thyself well, 
I will make thee heir to The Crown.”3  For this remark, Walker was tried 
              * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A. History and Political Science, 2010, Washington State University, Pullman, 
Washington. I would like to thank my faculty adviser Professor Stefano Moscato for his help 
throughout the process, as well as Kate Baldridge for her wonderful editing and boundless patience. 
I would also like to thank my family for all their support in getting me through law school. 
              1 Full Text of Obama’s Remarks to United Nations, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 25, 
2012, 10:29 AM), blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/09/25/full-text-of-obamas-remarks-to-united-
nations/. 
 2 Note, Threats To Take the Life of the President, 32 HARV. L. REV. 724, 725 (1919). 
 3 Id. 
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and found guilty of “compassing and imagining the death of the King,” 
an offense for which he was hanged, drawn, and quartered.4 
Making statements of a threatening nature toward the President of 
the United States, or candidates for the office, is not the capital offense it 
was in the tradition of European monarchs.  However, statements about 
the President no more intimidating or believable than Walker’s have 
been found threatening enough for current law to reach them.5  
Beginning with the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798 and continuing 
today, Presidents present and former, as well as candidates for the office, 
have been given special protection against statements and conduct 
construed to be threats in the form of executive-office-specific threat 
statutes.6 
While threats are a form of speech, the Supreme Court long ago 
held that “true threats” are not afforded First Amendment protection.7  
The true-threats doctrine first arose in the context of a presidential threat 
and it has been closely tied to threats against the President and the 
statutes that prohibit them ever since.8  Although true threats are 
proscribable regardless of their target, the unique concerns of the 
presidency raise special issues when courts are called on to judge 
statements that threaten elected officials. 
In United States v. Bagdasarian, the Ninth Circuit was called to 
decide whether defendant Walter Bagdasarian’s statements made on an 
Internet message board concerning then-presidential candidate Barack 
Obama constituted true threats unprotected by the Constitution.9  The 
statements were crude, ignorant, and violent in nature, and they touched 
on topics ranging from African-Americans to Muslims in the Middle 
East.10  One would be hard-pressed to argue that these message board 
posts contributed anything of substantial value to the national political 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Clark v. United States, 250 F. 449, 449 (5th Cir. 1918) (affirming conviction for 
statement that then-President “Wilson is a wooden-headed son of a bitch.  I wish Wilson was in hell, 
and if I had the power I would put him there.”). 
 6 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“While 
our Alien and Sedition Laws were in force, John Adams, President of the United States . . . was 
greeted by a crowd and by a committee that saluted him by firing a cannon. . . .  A bystander said 
‘There goes the President and they are firing at his ass.’  Luther Baldwin was indicted for replying 
that he did not care ‘if they fired through his ass.’  He was convicted in the federal court for speaking 
‘sedicious [sic] words tending to defame the President and Government of the United States’ and 
fined, assessed court costs and expenses, and committed to jail . . . .”). 
 7 Id. at 708 (majority opinion) (holding that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871 requires the 
government to prove a “true threat”). 
 8 Id. 
 9 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 10 Bagdasarian was charged with two violations of 18 U.S.C. § 879 for the statements “Re: 
Obama fk the niggar, he will have a 50 cal in the head soon” and “shoot the nig.” Id. at 1115. 
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debate regarding Obama’s candidacy.  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit 
determined the statements were merely crude expressions of the 
defendant’s opinions of candidate Obama, not true threats.11  More 
importantly, this conclusion marked a sharp departure from precedent 
regarding true threats.12  Whereas previously a statement only needed to 
be threatening in the view of a reasonable person, under Bagdasarian, 
the Ninth Circuit now requires a showing of the speaker’s subjective 
intent to threaten.13 
For better or worse, statements such as those made by Bagdasarian 
must be judged in accordance with the protections of the First 
Amendment and the special place Presidents and presidential candidates 
hold in the nation’s political discourse.  Words mean little without 
considering the speaker’s subjective intention, and gleaning the meaning 
of a statement from a purely objective standard fails to adequately 
protect speech regarding the President.  While the President must be 
protected to the greatest extent possible, such protection should not come 
at the expense of free expression. 
There is likely no position in the world where one receives more 
caustic and vilely worded criticism than that of the President of the 
United States.  As the most visible officer of the federal government, the 
President bears the brunt of the country’s criticism regarding the federal 
government.14  Colorfully worded disapproval of the Chief Executive is 
as old as the nation itself.15  Nevertheless, the Founding Fathers believed 
 11 See id. at 1123-24. 
 12 The vast majority of federal appellate case law analyzing statements under the true-threat 
doctrine has applied some form of an objective test that ignores the subjective intent of the speaker.  
See Paul T. Crane, Note,”True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1243 (2006) 
(providing a basic overview of the element of intent in true-threat jurisprudence).  In United States v. 
Bagdasarian, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment required the government to 
prove the speaker subjectively intended his or her statement to be a threat.  Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 
1116-17. 
 13 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117 (“In order to affirm a conviction under any threat statute 
that criminalizes pure speech, we must find sufficient evidence that the speech at issue constitutes a 
‘true threat,’ as defined in [Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)].  Because the true threat 
requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in Black must be read into all 
threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”). 
 14 See Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting) 
(“Many statements wholly protected against restriction by the First Amendment may ‘tend’ to 
contribute to the climate of hate which makes the free movement of the President dangerous.  The 
affirmations of the affluent as well as the militant exhortations of the dispossessed may have this 
tendency.  Many statements on political affairs may, by implication or through hyperbole, compass 
the violent end of the Chief Executive.  The threat of punishment for all such statements would exert 
a chilling effect on political speech too drastic to be consistent with the guarantee of free 
expression.”), rev’d, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
 15 See Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1114 (“In the country’s first contested Presidential election 
of 1800, supporters of Thomas Jefferson claimed that incumbent John Adams wanted to marry off 
3
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the value of free expression to a democratic society was great enough to 
guarantee it in the First Amendment of the Constitution, despite 
unsettling and ugly instances of its exercise.16  However, the Supreme 
Court has never applied a literal reading of that Amendment and long 
ago recognized certain limits to one of the most absolute mandates of the 
Constitution.17 
The true-threats doctrine began in Watts v. United States, in which 
the Court considered threatening statements aimed at then-President 
Lyndon B. Johnson.18  In addition to the traditionally allowed 
prohibitions on speech, the Watts Court held that the government may 
also proscribe true threats.19  However, the Court left the parameters of 
the doctrine undefined and, subsequently, a variety of tests developed in 
the lower courts to measure whether statements constituted true threats.20  
his son to the daughter of King George III to create an American dynasty under British rule; Adams 
supporters called Jefferson ‘a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a half-breed Indian squaw, 
sired by a Virginia mulatto father.’  Abraham Lincoln was derided as an ape, ghoul, lunatic, and 
savage, while Andrew Jackson was accused of adultery and murder, and opponents of Grover 
Cleveland chanted slogans that he had fathered a child out-of-wedlock.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) 
(“Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as 
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government.  They recognized the risks to which all human 
institutions are subject.  But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that 
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the 
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; 
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.  Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its 
worst form.  Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.” (footnote omitted)), overruled 
in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 17 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 18 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
 19 Id. at 708 (“[18 U.S.C. § 871] initially requires the Government to prove a true ‘threat.’”). 
 20 Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
283, 302 (2001) (“The Supreme Court’s minimal guidance has left each circuit to fashion its own 
test.”). 
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In particular, courts have disagreed on whether a subjective intent to 
threaten is required for a statement to be considered a true threat.21 
For cases involving the President, virtually all courts use some form 
of an objective standard that bases the threat calculation on the 
perceptions of a reasonable person.22  While the tests of the various 
federal circuits are generally similar, significant differences exist 
regarding the requisite standard of intent applicable to true threats.23  
This confusion is not unwarranted—after Watts, the Supreme Court did 
not rule on the intent element of the true-threats doctrine for over thirty 
years.24  The silence broke in Virginia v. Black, when the Court held that 
“‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”25  
As it turns out, however, this definition failed to adequately clarify the 
true-threats doctrine, and the federal courts remain divided on this issue 
of intent.26 
Using the true-threats definition from Black, the Bagdasarian court 
sought to settle tension in the Ninth Circuit regarding the proper standard 
by which to measure true threats.27  While the Bagdasarian court 
 21 See Crane, supra note 12 (providing a general discussion of true threat intent standards). 
 22 Lauren Gilbert, Mocking George: Political Satire as “True Threat” in the Age of Global 
Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 868 (2004) (“Subsequent criminal cases in the various circuits 
involving threats to the President and other government officials have departed from Watts, often 
upholding jury verdicts of guilty despite evidence that the statements were not intended as threats.  
In the majority of these cases, the jury was instructed to apply a reasonable person standard to the 
question of whether a statement was a true threat or protected speech.”). 
 23 See Crane, supra note 12, at 1235-37 (providing a basic overview of the various tests 
federal appellate courts have used and some of the differences between them (citing United States v. 
Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 771 (2d Cir. 
1994); United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 558 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 
1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972); Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918); United 
States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Bly, CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 
2621996 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005), aff’d, 510 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Richards, 
415 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2005); G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free 
Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 937-1002 
(2002); Jordan Strauss, Context Is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating True 
Threats Under the First Amendment, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 231 (2003))). 
 24 See Crane, supra note 12, at 1252-53 (pointing out the Supreme Court’s silence on the 
issue of true threat intent); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 25 Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
 26 See Mark Strasser, Advocacy, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 38 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 339, 376 (2011). 
 27 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because of 
comments made in some of our cases, we begin by clearing up the perceived confusion as to whether 
a subjective or objective analysis is required when examining whether a threat is criminal under 
5
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declared a subjective-intent analysis to be constitutionally required in all 
cases of true threats,28 this Note concerns only the court’s analysis as it 
relates to threats to the President and candidates for the office.  
Presidents and presidential candidates are the subject of unique concerns 
when considering threatening statements that warrant an independent 
analysis in the discussion of intent for true threats.29 
Prohibiting true threats is justified on the grounds of “protecting 
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear 
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur.”30  The purview of the true-threats doctrine is not limited to 
statements aimed at the Executive Branch, but the justifications for it 
have special force when applied to the President.31  As the Supreme 
Court stated, “The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an 
overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and 
in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of 
physical violence.”32  Further, threats against the President have the 
potential to mobilize the Secret Service and the resources that agency 
requires.33  Presidential safety undoubtedly deserves great deference, but 
this concern must be weighed against the country’s fundamental interest 
in the free expression of ideas crucial to the exercise of democratic 
liberty.34  However, as exemplified by the Ninth Circuit in 
Bagdasarian,35 striking this balance is no easy task. 
various threat statutes and the First Amendment.” (citing United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 
1018 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2007))). 
 28 Id. at 1117 (“Because the true threat requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the 
subjective test set forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”). 
 29 See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969) (“A threat against the 
President may cause substantial harm and is qualitatively different from a threat against a private 
citizen or other public official.  A President not only has a personal interest in his own security, as 
does everyone, he also has a public duty not to allow himself to be unnecessarily exposed to danger.  
A President’s death in office has worldwide repercussions and affects the security and future of the 
entire nation.  The President and his advisors would therefore be irresponsible if they ignored 
apparently serious threats against the President’s life.” (footnote omitted)). 
 30 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (citing Watts v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam)). 
 31 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See Gilbert, supra note 22, at 850-52 (describing the duties and operating procedures of 
the Secret Service; citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE & THREAT 
ASSESSMENT INVESTIGATIONS: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 
(July 1998)); see also United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (“When [the] 
intended recipient is the President of the United States, a threat sets in motion an entire army of 
Secret Service agents and law enforcement officials who must investigate the threat, take additional 
safety precautions to protect the President, and in extreme cases, alter the President’s schedule.”). 
 34 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
 35 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit found the proper balance 
between protecting speech and the President by interpreting the true-
threats doctrine and the construction of presidential-threat statutes to 
require a subjective intent to threaten, in addition to one of the traditional 
objective standards for true threats.  The application of a solely objective 
standard to threats against the President leads to unsettling results that 
punish speech without need.36  Harmless but misguided individuals have 
been held criminally responsible for ludicrous statements based on the 
sensitivities of the fabled “reasonable person,” regardless of the 
speakers’ actual motivations for their statements.37  More importantly, 
this nation’s historic dedication to free expression demands a policy 
under which citizens need not whisper when referring to the Chief 
Executive they elected.  Even when the language used in reference to the 
President is crude, violent or racist, it must nevertheless be allowed into 
the marketplace of ideas.  As Noam Chomsky said, “If we don’t believe 
in free expression for people we despise, we don’t believe in it at all.”38 
In Part I, this Note introduces the primary presidential-threat 
statutes and explains why Presidents and presidential candidates should 
be treated the same for the purposes of true-threat jurisprudence.  Part II 
traces the history of the true-threats doctrine and introduces the relevant 
tests of intent developed among the federal courts for evaluating 
presidential true threats.  Part III discusses Bagdasarian, its procedural 
history, and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of the true-
threats doctrine.  Part IV explains the shortcomings of using only an 
objective test for measuring true threats.  Next, Part V argues the 
strengths of adding a subjective-intent element to the doctrine, and the 
special status of the President that necessitates its inclusion.  Finally, this 
Note concludes by arguing that when the subject of a threat is the 
President or a candidate for the office, despite precedent to the contrary, 
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bagdasarian correctly interpreted 
the true-threat doctrine. 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (incarcerated person 
convicted for violating § 871 despite inability to execute his threats); United States v. Crews, 781 
F.2d 826, 829-30 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (psychiatric patient who had taken a large amount of 
antidepressants convicted under § 871 for a statement made in a panel discussion after viewing a 
film at a veteran’s hospital). 
 37 See, e.g., Crews, 781 F.2d at 829-30 (sedated psychiatric patient of a hospital in Sheridan, 
Wyoming, convicted under § 871 for saying, “If Reagan came to Sheridan, I would shoot him,” after 
watching the film THE DAY AFTER); see also United States v. Rogers, 488 F.2d 512, 513 (5th Cir. 
1974), rev’d on other grounds, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (alcoholic convicted under § 871 for saying he 
was going to walk to Washington, D. C., from Louisiana and “whip Nixon’s ass”). 
 38 Interview by John Pilger with Noam Chomsky (Nov. 25, 1992), transcript available at 
jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/14177.htm. 
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I. ACTING PRESIDENTS AND SERIOUS CANDIDATES SHOULD BE 
TREATED THE SAME IN THE TRUE-THREAT ANALYSIS 
Initially, it is important to note that Bagdasarian concerned a threat 
against a serious presidential candidate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 879,39  
not an acting President who would be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 871.40  
However, serious candidates—those that are afforded Secret Service 
protection under 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(7)41—can and should be treated the 
same as acting Presidents. 
The vast majority of true-threat jurisprudence relating to the Chief 
Executive has involved threats against acting Presidents, not serious 
presidential candidates.  As a practical matter, however, there is no 
significant reason to treat the two differently when they are the targets of 
threatening statements.  Both the language of the respective threat 
statutes covering Presidents and candidates, and the policies behind 
proscribing those threatening statements, support the use of the same 
intent standard in either case. 
Prior to Bagdasarian, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. 
Gordon that a violation of § 879 required a finding of both the speaker’s 
subjective intent to threaten and an objectively threatening statement, as 
opposed to § 871, which required only an objectively threatening 
 39 18 U.S.C.A. § 879(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to 
kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon— (1) a former President or a member of the immediate 
family of a former President; (2) a member of the immediate family of the President, the President-
elect, the Vice President, or the Vice President-elect; (3) a major candidate for the office of President 
or Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such candidate; or (4) a person protected 
by the Secret Service under section 3056(a)(6); shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 5 years, or both.”). 
 40 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1115; 18 U.S.C.A. § 871(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“Whoever 
knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery . . . any . . . writing . . . 
containing any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the 
United States, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession 
to the office of President of the United States, or the Vice President-elect, or knowingly and willfully 
otherwise makes any such threat against the President, President-elect, Vice President or other 
officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3056(a)(6) (Westlaw 2012) (authorizing Secret Service protection of certain persons). 
 41 18 U.S.C.A. § 3056(a)(7) (Westlaw 2012) (“Under the direction of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following 
persons: . . .  Major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days of the general 
Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates.  As used in this paragraph, the term ‘major 
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates’ means those individuals identified as such by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security after consultation with an advisory committee consisting of the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the 
majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and one additional member selected by the other 
members of the committee. . . .”). 
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statement.42  However, the wording of sections 879 and 871 are 
substantially similar on their face, making it unclear where a distinction 
between the two can be found.   Section 879 states:  43
Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, kidnap, or inflict 
bodily harm upon . . . a major candidate for the office of President or 
Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such 
candidate; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.44   
Comparatively, § 871 states: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail 
or for a delivery . . . [any] writing, . . . containing any threat to take the 
life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the 
United States, . . . or other officer next in the order of succession . . . 
or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against 
the President, . . . or other officer next in the order of succession to the 
office of President, . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.45 
Aside from whom the statutes are designed to protect, the only 
difference on the face of the statutes appears to be § 871’s specific 
reference to threats made through the mail.46  However, this difference 
appears trivial, as neither statute requires the threat to be communicated 
to any person in particular, and the absence of a specific statement about 
mailed threats in § 879 does not appear to preclude its application to 
threats sent in such a manner.47 
Courts have applied different standards of intent for each of these 
two statutes but have failed to adequately justify the disparate 
treatment.48  Both the Ninth Circuit in Gordon49 and the District Court 
 42 United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 43 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 871, 879 (Westlaw 2012). 
 44 18 U.S.C.A. § 879(a)(3) (Westlaw 2012). 
 45 18 U.S.C.A § 871(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 46 Id. (“Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a 
delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier . . . .”). 
 47 Section 879 simply omits any mention of how the statement is sent or received, thereby 
extending its application to any medium.  18 U.S.C.A. § 871(a) (Westlaw 2012); see United States v. 
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (threats sent via the Internet).  The difference in wording 
is likely a difference in drafting conventions of the different sessions of Congress that enacted them. 
 48 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding § 879 to require 
the government to show speaker subjectively intended his or her statement to be a threat).  But see 
Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding § 871 to require only a showing that the 
statement was objectively a threat for conviction); see also Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117 n.14 
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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Kosma50 held 
that violations of § 879 require the speaker to have a subjective intent to 
threaten, while only an objective-based test applied to § 871.51  The 
defendant in Kosma was charged with violating both sections 879 and 
871, and appealed his conviction for the latter after being found not 
guilty of violating § 879.52  The district court pulled the distinction from 
the legislative history of § 879,53 but failed to explain why the two 
statutes should be treated differently.54 
On appeal, the Third Circuit did not challenge the interpretation55 
and thus never analyzed its propriety, save one footnote that stated: 
“there is arguably less reason to be concerned from a national security 
standpoint when a threat is made against a former President than when it 
is made against a current President.”56  While former Presidents may not 
be as crucial to the country as acting Presidents, the distinction holds 
significantly less weight when candidates—also covered under § 879—
are considered.57  Both statutes implicate Secret Service protection and 
its attendant costs.58  Additionally, the legislative history fails to support 
this inconsistent interpretation of the statutes, as congressional reports 
regarding § 871 also support a subjective-intent requirement.59 
Furthermore, § 879 was drafted well after § 871 and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Watts.60  As one commentator  has pointed out, this 61
(discussing the inconsistent treatment of § 871 and § 879 within the Ninth Circuit); Gilbert, supra 
note 22, at 879-82 (discussing the disparate treatment of § 871 and § 879). 
 49 Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117. 
 50 United States v. Kosma, 749 F. Supp. 1392, 1401-02 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d, 951 F.2d 549 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 51 Id.; Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117; see discussion infra Part II. 
 52 Kosma, 951 F.2d at 552-53. 
 53 United States v. Kosma, 749 F. Supp. 1392, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d, 951 F.2d 549 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
 54 Kosma, 951 F.2d at 552 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he district court’s opinion does not explain 
why section 879 should be treated differently from section 871 . . . .”). 
 55 Id. at 552. 
 56 Id. at 552 n.5. 
 57 18 U.S.C.A. § 879(a)(3) (Westlaw 2012). 
 58 18 U.S.C.A. § 3056 (a)(1), (7) (Westlaw 2012) (“Under the direction of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following persons: 
The President . . . . [and] Major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates . . . .”). 
 59 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The sponsors 
thus rather plainly intended [§ 871] to require a showing that the defendant appreciated the 
threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was 
a serious one.”). 
 60 See Gilbert, supra note 22, at 879-80. 
 61 Id. (analyzing the related true-threats issue of when the determination of whether a 
statement is a true threat should go to a jury in the case of Presidents and other public officials). 
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is significant in light of the development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence: 
[Section] 871 was first passed in 1916, during a very dark period in 
the nation’s First Amendment history, while § 879 was passed 
subsequent to the Court’s decision in Watts thus explicitly integrating 
the Court’s ruling.  The Court in Watts, in finding § 871 constitutional 
on its face, interpreted the statute consistent with the First Amendment 
and the Court’s evolving jurisprudence in this area.  Moreover, the 
legislative history of § 879, in interpreting the meaning of “knowingly 
and willfully,” noted the doctrinal confusion among the lower courts 
regarding the mens rea requirement and could be read as applying to 
true threats in general.62 
This commentator further explained the “dark period” in First 
Amendment history, noting: “This was the same period when Congress 
passed the Espionage Act of 1918 outlawing speech critical of the 
government’s war effort.  It was also the period when Eugene Debs’s 
conviction for sedition for criticizing World War I was upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.”63 
If Congress intended the statutes to be different, any interpretation 
of that difference must surely weigh in favor of choosing to treat the 
identical “knowingly and willfully” elements as the legislature intended 
them in § 879 rather than § 871.64  Congressional committee reports 
accompanying § 879 explicitly mentioned the lower courts’ inconsistent 
interpretations of § 871, and included a discussion of these cases in 
reference to their explanation that convictions under § 879 should require 
a subjective intent to threaten.65  The Committee felt that the proper 
balance of safety for public officials and “the fundamental interests 
shared by all Americans in free and uninhibited speech, especially where 
public figures are concerned,” warranted a subjective-intent-to-threaten 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 879 n.247 (citing Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)). 
 64 The House Report accompanying § 879 specifically points to affording the same 
protection to Secret Service protectees as is given to the President in § 871: “This bill would, in part, 
accomplish this goal [of extending Secret Service authority] by extending to various other protectees 
of the Secret Service the same type of protection against threats of physical harm which is presently 
afforded to the President . . . .”  H.R. REP. NO. 97-725, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2624, 2629. 
 65 H.R. REP. NO. 97-725, at 3 (“The Committee is aware that the term ‘knowingly and 
willfully’ as used in section 871 has not been uniformly construed by the courts.” (citing Rogers v. 
United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293 
(4th Cir. 1970), adhered to, 438 F.2d 13 (1970) (en banc); Pierce v. United States, 365 F.2d 292 
(10th Cir. 1966); Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643 (7th Cir. 1918))). 
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requirement.   Congress may have been unable to change the lower 
courts’ interpretation of the statute already in effect, but it certainly 
clarified its intentions the second time around. 
66
Despite this clear congressional intent, in United States v. Johnson, 
the Second Circuit rejected both the Gordon and Kosma subjective-intent 
interpretations of § 879.67  The Johnson court noted that Congress chose 
to use the same “knowingly and willingly” language while presumably 
well aware of its history in § 871.68  Although the court discussed the 
legislative history of § 879, it quickly dismissed the congressional 
reports as “hazardously uncertain guidance in interpreting § 879.”69  
However, the “uncertain” language cited seems fairly clear: “A 
prosecution under this section would not only require proof that the 
statement could reasonably be perceived as a threat, but would also 
require some evidence that the maker intended the statement to be a 
threat.”70  Despite the committee pointing out its awareness of the 
judicial interpretation of § 871, and then proceeding to encourage the 
addition of an element in § 879 traditionally absent from that 
interpretation, the Johnson court remained unconvinced.71  Instead, the 
court reasoned that while the congressional committee construed 
“knowingly and willfully” to “require proof that a defendant’s statement 
could reasonably be perceived as a threat, it would require only some 
evidence that the maker intended the statement to be a threat.”72  
Apparently for the Second Circuit, “some evidence” meant no evidence, 
 66 H.R. REP. No. 97-725, at 4 (“[T]he Committee recognizes the fundamental interests shared 
by all Americans in free and uninhibited speech, especially where public figures are concerned.  
Therefore, the Committee construes a threat that is ‘knowingly and willfully’ made as one which the 
maker intends to be perceived as a threat regardless of whether he or she intends to carry it out.  A 
prosecution under this section would not only require proof that the statement could reasonably be 
perceived as a threat, but would also require some evidence that the maker intended the statement to 
be a threat.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 67 United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 771 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We conclude that § 879, like § 
871, requires only proof of a statement that a reasonable person would perceive as a threat, and 
accordingly that the district court properly ruled that evidence of diminished mental capacity should 
be excluded.”). 
 68 Id. (“At the time Congress enacted § 879, the interpretation of the phrase ‘knowingly and 
wilfully’ [sic] in § 871 that had been articulated in Roy and its progeny was widely accepted in the 
federal courts.  The fact that Congress chose to adopt this and other substantially identical language 
in enacting § 879, which addresses a concern parallel to that engaged by § 871, bespeaks an 
intention to import the established general intent interpretation of § 871 into the new statute.”). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 770 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-725, at 4). 
 71 Id. at 770 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-725, at 4). 
 72 Id. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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as it upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of diminished 
mental capacity as largely irrelevant to the “reasonable person” inquiry.73 
For the Ninth Circuit, Bagdasarian’s extension of the subjective-
intent requirement to all threat statutes essentially nullifies any difference 
in analysis between sections 879 and 871.74  While the Gordon decision 
previously required both an objective- and a subjective-intent analysis 
for § 879,75 following Bagdasarian the Ninth Circuit will add a 
subjective-intent analysis to the traditionally applied objective test for § 
871,  constructively placing both statutes on the same analytical footing. 76
The nation clearly has an interest in protecting the security of the 
President and allowing him or her to move freely throughout the country.  
These justifications apply with equal force when serious presidential 
candidates are considered, especially in the case of Bagdasarian.77  
Americans have an important interest in protecting the democratic 
process by guaranteeing the safety of candidates for the presidency.  If 
candidates are not free to move throughout the country for fear of 
physical harm, it could have disastrous effects on the electoral process.  
Many citizens could be deprived of the opportunity to be exposed to new 
candidates, impeding their ability to make informed, intelligent voting 
decisions. 
One of the major justifications for proscribing threats against the 
President relates to the cost and effort put forth by the Secret Service in 
response to such statements.78  In 2010, the Secret Service employed 
over 6,800 agents and had a budget of over 1.4 billion dollars for the 
protection of Presidents and dignitaries,79 as well as certain other 
 73 After noting that Congress intended § 879 to require “some evidence” of an intent to 
threaten, the court held: “We conclude that § 879, like § 871, requires only proof of a statement that 
a reasonable person would perceive as a threat, and accordingly that the district court properly ruled 
that evidence of diminished mental capacity should be excluded.”  Johnson, 14 F.3d at 771.  
Essentially, the court found that congressional intent to require “some evidence” was not the same as 
an intention to require “proof.”  Id. 
 74 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the true 
threat requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in [Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343 (2003),] must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.  The 
difference is that with respect to some threat statutes, we require that the purported threat meet an 
objective standard in addition, and for some we do not.”). 
 75 United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 76 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117-18. 
 77 Id. at 1126 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the target of 
Bagdasarian’s threatening statements eventually went on to become President). 
 78 See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (“When that intended 
recipient is the President of the United States, a threat sets in motion an entire army of Secret Service 
agents and law enforcement officials who must investigate the threat, take additional safety 
precautions to protect the President, and in extreme cases, alter the President’s schedule.”). 
 79 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE FISCAL YEAR 
2010 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2010), available at www.secretservice.gov/USSS2010AYweb.pdf. 
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investigative responsibilities for the Department of the Treasury.80  More 
importantly for this discussion, however, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3056, 
major presidential and vice presidential candidates and their spouses are 
given Secret Service protection as soon as 120 days before the general 
presidential election.   While candidates may not be as dramatically 
important as acting Presidents, there remains a substantial interest in 
preserving candidate safety and mobility sufficient to justify the cost of 
Secret Service protection.  During their campaigns, presidential 
candidates are subject to criticisms that are similar to, if not greater than, 
those leveled at acting Presidents. 
81
President Obama’s own road to the White House exemplified the 
tension inherent to a presidential race.82  The candidacy of a black man 
for President polarized the United States to such a degree that heightened 
fear of violence against then-candidate Obama led Homeland Security to 
authorize Secret Service protection for him as early as May 2007—a year 
and a half before the election—significantly earlier than most candidates 
receive such protection.83  Arguably, these security interests could justify 
the lower threshold of the objective standard when analyzing a threat, but 
it is no less important that people be able to speak freely, even crudely, 
when expressing their opinions on presidential candidates.  In the case of 
Bagdasarian in particular, the presidential race consisted of only non-
incumbent candidates following the second term of President George W. 
Bush.   Effectively, this meant that one of the candidates would shortly 
become the next President, strengthening the justification for treating a 
presidential candidate the same as an acting President. 
84
For the purposes of true-threats analyses serious presidential 
candidates can and should be treated the same as acting Presidents.  The 
reasoning behind President-specific threat statutes applies equally to 
candidates and acting Presidents, and the nearly identical statutes should 
be interpreted accordingly. 
 80 SHAWN REESE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34603, THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE: AN 
EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF ITS EVOLVING MISSIONS 1 (Apr. 16, 2012), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL34603.pdf. 
 81 18 U.S.C.A. § 3056(7) (Westlaw 2012). 
 82 See Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1113-14 (“The election of our first black President produced 
a campaign with vitriolic personal attacks . . . .  [T]he 2008 presidential election was unique in the 
combination of racial, religious, and ethnic bias that contributed to the extreme enmity expressed at 
various points during the campaign.”). 
 83 Id. at 1126 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 84 See id. (majority opinion). 
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II. THE STANDARDS OF INTENT 
A. WATTS: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN 
In Watts v. United States, the United States Supreme Court reached 
beyond interpretation of the language of § 871 into the First Amendment, 
where it found for the first time a constitutional requirement that limits 
the proscription of threatening statements to “true threats.”85  
Unfortunately, however, the Watts court provided the lower courts with 
sparse guidance on the parameters of this new doctrine.86  In the absence 
of an articulated standard, the lower courts have struggled to develop a 
consistent standard for true threats.87 
Watts involved the statements of an eighteen-year-old man made at 
a rally protesting the draft.88  An Army Counter Intelligence Corps 
investigator overheard Robert Watts say, 
And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I 
have got to report for my physical this Monday coming.  I am not 
going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in 
my sights is L.B.J.  They are not going to make me kill my black 
brothers.89 
The court began its analysis by noting the lower court’s statutory 
interpretation of the word “willfully” in § 871, under which Watts was 
charged, but declared “whatever the ‘willfullness’ requirement implies, 
the statute initially requires the Government to prove a true ‘threat.’”90 
 85 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 86 See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The Court 
in Watts, however, set forth no particular definition or description of a true threat that distinguishes 
an unprotected threat from protected speech.  Thus, the lower courts have been left to ascertain for 
themselves when a statement triggers the government’s interest in preventing the disruption and fear 
of violence associated with a threat.”); Strauss, supra note 23, at 242 (“For the Supreme Court, threat 
speech started, and apparently ended, with Watts v. United States.”). 
 87 See infra note 103 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 
1007, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the inconsistency within the Ninth Circuit following 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), regarding true threats); United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002); Roy 
v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
 88 Watts, 394 U.S. at 706-07. 
 89 Id. at 706. 
 90 Id. at 707-08 (“The judges in the Court of Appeals differed over whether or not the 
‘willfullness’ requirement of the statute implied that a defendant must have intended to carry out his 
‘threat.’  Some early cases found the willfullness requirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered 
the charged words with ‘an apparent determination to carry them into execution.’ . . .  Perhaps this 
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Instead of analyzing Watts’s intent, the Court relied on three factors 
when it measured his statements: (1) the nature of the statement, (2) the 
context in which the statement was made, and (3) the reaction of the 
listeners to the statement.91  The Court noted that the statement was 
conditional because the threat was contingent on Watts being drafted and 
given a rifle.92  Further, the statement was made at a political rally where 
those who heard the statement (aside from the Army Intelligence officer) 
responded with laughter.93 
Watts’s statements were best characterized as a form of “political 
hyperbole” and “his only offense here was a kind of very crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to the President.”94  He was 
simply expressing his feelings on a political issue.  Although 
distastefully worded, on balance with the nation’s “overwhelming[] 
interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive” and the fact that § 
871 “makes criminal a form of pure speech” that “must be interpreted 
with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind,” the 
statement at issue tipped the scales in favor of the latter’s protection of 
speech.95  Watts did not genuinely intend to harm or truly threaten the 
President; rather, he was simply sarcastically wording his political 
opinion.96 
Watts primarily stands for the proposition that regardless of the 
“willfully and knowingly” intent requirements, in light of the First 
Amendment, “the statute initially requires the Government to prove a 
true ‘threat.’”97  Following Watts, whenever a statute criminalizes speech 
as threatening, the court must look not only at the intent requirement 
written into the statute, but must further apply the statute so as to punish 
interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it.” (quoting Ragansky v. United 
States, 253 F. 643 (1918))). 
 91 Id. (“We agree with petitioner that his only offense here was ‘a kind of very crude 
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.’  Taken in context, and regarding 
the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how 
it could be interpreted otherwise.”); see Strauss, supra note 23, at 242-43. 
 92 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
 93 Id. at 706-07 (“[P]etitioner’s statement was made during a political debate, . . . it was 
expressly made conditional upon an event-induction into the Armed Forces—which petitioner 
vowed would never occur, and . . . both petitioner and the crowd laughed after the statement was 
made.”). 
 94 Id. at 708. 
 95 Id. at 707. 
 96 Id. at 708. 
 97 Id.; see also United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1970) (“In deciding 
Watts, the Court recognized two major elements in the offense created by Congress in 18 U.S.C. 
Section 871(a).  The first is that there be proved a true ‘threat,’ and the second is that the threat be 
made ‘knowingly and willfully.’” (citations omitted)), adhered to, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en 
banc). 
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only “true threats.”98  For example, a statute may, by its language, 
require a threat be made “knowingly,”99 but even if a defendant makes a 
threatening statement “knowingly,” the statement can be proscribed only 
if it also constitutes a true threat.100 
The Watts Court made no mention of whether an objective- or a 
subjective-intent standard should be used to qualify a statement as a true 
threat.  Instead, it concluded that Watts’s statements were not true threats 
based on the factors pointed out above.101  Since this seminal case, 
evaluating a statement as a true threat has largely been framed in terms 
of either the intent of the speaker or how the statement could be 
objectively interpreted.102 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TRUE-THREAT STANDARDS AFTER WATTS: 
THE TRUE-THREATS TESTS 
After Watts, the intent standard necessary for a threat conviction 
became the key to true-threat analyses.103  The appropriate standard must 
balance protecting individuals from the fear that threats create with the 
right to free expression that is fundamental to a democratic society.104  
Most courts agree on this point, but the proper measure of a true threat 
 98 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“But whatever the ‘willfullness’ requirement implies, the statute 
initially requires the Government to prove a true ‘threat.’”). 
 99 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 876(c) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting knowingly transmitting threats 
through the mail). 
 100 United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying a First 
Amendment analysis when considering a defendant’s threatening statement under 18 U.S.C. § 
876(c), which prohibits “knowingly” transmitting threats through the mail (citing Watts, 394 U.S. 
705; 18 U.S.C. § 876(c))). 
 101 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 102 See Crane, supra note 12, at 1234 (“Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, until Black, 
usually addressed true threats tangentially and typically had nothing to say regarding the issue of 
intent.  As one commentator put it, writing on the eve of Black, ‘[f]or the Supreme Court, threat 
speech started, and apparently ended, with Watts v. United States.’  Consequently, lower courts, left 
with little guidance, blindly searched for an answer to the following question: what mens rea, if any, 
must a speaker have for his communication to constitute a true threat?” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Strauss, supra note 23, at 242)). 
 103 See id.  Volumes have been written on the objective/subjective division among the circuits.  
This Note, however, seeks only to give an overview of the history and development relevant to true 
threats against the President.  For more thorough discussions of federal courts of appeals’ treatment 
of the intent standard and other issues regarding true threats, see Blakey & Murray, supra note 23, at 
1003-10; Strauss, supra note 23; Strasser, supra note 26, at 344; Crane, supra note 12; Rothman, 
supra note 20. 
 104 United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 714 (7th Cir. 1986) (Will, J., dissenting) (“In this 
case we are called upon to strike the delicate balance between the right to express opposition or even 
vehement disagreement with governmental leaders and the necessity for protecting the President and 
maintaining political order.”). 
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has been the subject of much debate.105  A standard that is too broad 
could chill speech by criminalizing too much, while a standard that is too 
narrow could leave the innocent in fear by criminalizing too little.  With 
this safety/speech dichotomy in mind, post-Watts courts have developed 
intent standards for true threats that fall into two basic categories: 
subjective and objective, with the latter being further divisible into sub-
categories.106  The objective test has been manifested in several ways, 
but the only iterations relevant to threats against the President are the 
“reasonable-speaker,” “reasonable-listener,” and “neutral-perspective” 
standards.107  As for the subjective tests, while one court has applied a 
“subjective-present–intent-to-carry-out-the-threat” variation, the only 
iteration of the test that remains viable is the “present-intent-to-threaten” 
test.108  Because this Note is focused on threats against the President, the 
discussion focuses only on those subjective and objective tests that have 
been applied to the President.109 
1. The Reasonable-Speaker Test 
The reasonable-speaker test was first articulated in Roy v. United 
States, where the Ninth Circuit analyzed a threatening statement under § 
 105 See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 106 Crane, supra note 12, at 1235-36. 
 107 Id. at 1243. 
 108 United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1970) (“We hold that where, as in 
Patillo’s case, a true threat against the person of the President is uttered without communication to 
the President intended, the threat can form a basis for conviction under the terms of Section 871(a) 
only if made with a present intention to do injury to the President.  Such intent may take the form of 
a bad purpose to personally do harm to the President or to incite some other person to do the injury.  
This is the most reasonable construction of the statute’s plain language viewed in light of Congress’ 
manifest purpose to protect ‘the safety of (the) Chief Executive.’” (footnote omitted)), adhered to, 
438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).  The case has since been limited to its facts by the Fourth 
Circuit.  United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Our decision in Patillo did 
not create an additional element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).  Our discussion in Patillo 
of the intent to restrict the President’s movements was part of an illustration of the ways in which the 
government may prove that a threat was made ‘knowingly and willfully.’  Specifically, we stated 
that ‘[w]hen a threat is published with an intent to disrupt presidential activity, we think there is 
sufficient mens rea . . . .’” (quoting Patillo, 438 F.2d at 15–16 (4th Cir. 1971))).  Courts outside the 
Fourth Circuit have rejected the test, and no other instances of its application can be found.  See 
United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Patillo is a distinctly minority view; 
indeed, all other circuits addressing the issue of the proper standard to apply under § 871 or § 876 
have rejected the subjective standard.  Furthermore, even the Fourth Circuit seems to be moving 
away from the subjective standard . . . .”). 
 109 Some scholars have noted that the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have both 
employed somewhat unique “true-threats” tests, but neither of them has been applied to the 
President.  For a discussion of these tests as well as a more in-depth discussion of the objective tests, 
see Blakey & Murray, supra note 23, at 1003-10. 
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871.110  Curiously, although Roy is often cited as the originator of the 
First Amendment reasonable-speaker true-threats test,111 the court 
actually felt the case did not present a free-speech issue.112  The court 
essentially engaged in an exercise of statutory construction to determine 
what standard of intent the statute required, as opposed to analyzing the 
statement the trial court had already determined to be a threat.113  
However, after Roy several circuits borrowed the court’s interpretation to 
form the basis for a First Amendment true-threat analysis.114  As one 
commentator put it, “for the reasonable speaker test, what started as pure 
statutory construction morphed into a constitutional interpretation of true 
threats.”115 
Roy involved a threat targeting President Lyndon B. Johnson made 
by a U.S. Marine stationed at Camp Pendleton.116  With the President 
scheduled to arrive at the base the following day, Roy called an operator 
from a pay phone and told her to “[t]ell the President that he should not 
 110 Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 111 See Gilbert, supra note 22, at 873-74 (discussing the objective test from Roy v. United 
States); Crane, supra note 12, at 1238-39 (same). 
 112 Roy, 416 F.2d at 879 n.17 (“Roy does not contend on appeal that the conviction infringes 
on his First Amendment rights.  Unlike the situation in Watts v. United States, there does not appear 
to be a free speech issue in this case.”). 
 113 Id. at 876. 
 114 E.g., United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986).  In Hoffman, the 
Seventh Circuit noted that § 871 “must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment 
clearly in mind.  What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected 
speech.”  Id.  Following a brief discussion of the true-threats issue, the court quoted Roy v. United 
States, 416 F.2d at 877, for its conclusion that “in order for the government to establish a ‘true 
threat’ it must demonstrate that the defendant made a statement ‘in a context or under such 
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by 
those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President.’”  Id. 
 115 Crane, supra note 12, at 1245.  Curiously, true threats appear to have a dual history as both 
a constitutional doctrine and a method of statutory construction.  See Blakey & Murray, supra note 
23, at 937 (“The lack of uniformity [among the circuits] may be traced in large part to the conflation 
of the question of whether a statement is a “true threat” for the purposes of (1) the requisite state of 
mind under the particular statute at issue and (2) for the scope of the First Amendment.”).  
According to one district judge, “[t]he confusion results from too loose a use of the phrase ‘true 
threat.’”  United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).  The problem likely originates from the 
doctrine’s birthplace in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).  The Watts Court 
began with a discussion of the “willfulness” requirement of § 871 but then proceeded to drop the 
issue entirely, simply declaring that the statements at issue were not “true threats.”  Id. at 707-08.  
However, the Court provided little to no explanation of what a “true threat” was.  The distinction is 
unnecessary when considering threats against the President, however, as the statute that governs 
threats against the President and the proper construction of its terms was at the heart of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutionally based Watts opinion, which created the true-threats doctrine.  Id.  For § 871, 
statutory construction and constitutionality go hand-in-hand. 
 116 Roy, 416 F.2d at 875. 
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come aboard the base or he would be killed.”117  Despite Roy’s 
conflicting testimony, he was tried without a jury and found guilty of 
violating § 871.118  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.119 
The Ninth Circuit in Roy read § 871’s “willingly and knowingly” 
language as requiring 
[O]nly that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or 
oral, in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those 
to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the 
life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of 
mistake, duress, or coercion. The statute does not require that the 
defendant actually intend to carry out the threat.120 
This standard essentially has two “intents” to satisfy, both drawn 
from statutory language of § 871.121  “Knowingly” requires the 
government to prove the offending statement “was not the result of 
mistake, duress or coercion.”122  “Willfully” imputes a negligence 
standard on the speaker, and all that the government must prove for 
conviction is that a reasonable person would have known the speech 
would be perceived as a threat to the President. 123 
This speaker-oriented standard was far and away the preferred test 
of the lower courts following Watts—in addition to the Ninth Circuit, the 
First, Second,124 Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits adopted some 
form of the reasonable-speaker test in most instances.125 
 117 Id. (statement based on the phone operator’s testimony). 
 118 Roy testified that he actually said, “Hello, baby. I hear the President is coming to the base. 
I’m going to get him.”  Id. 
 119 Id. at 879. 
 120 Id. at 877-78. 
 121 Roy’s definition can be separated into two parts, namely (1) the “willingly” portion: a 
statement made in a context that a reasonable person would perceive as a serious expression of an 
intention to harm the President; and (2) the “knowingly” portion: the statement was not a result of 
mistake, duress, or coercion.  Id. at 876. 
 122 See United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1972) (discussing jury 
instructions incorporating the Roy formulation). 
 123 See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard, charging the defendant with responsibility 
for the effect of his statements on his listeners.”); see also Blakey & Murray, supra note 23, at 1003-
10; Crane, supra note 12, at 1244. 
 124 The Second Circuit generally applies a test different from those mentioned in this Note, 
but it has not yet applied this test to the President, so it will not be discussed here.  See Blakey & 
Murray, supra note 23, at 1003-05 (discussing the Second Circuit true-threat test as applied in 
United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999); Rothman, supra note 20, at 306-08 
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2. The Reasonable-Listener Test 
The reasonable-listener (or “reasonable-recipient”) test, was first 
articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Maisonet, in which a 
man was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 876 for sending threatening letters 
through the mail to a judge.126  As articulated by the Second Circuit, 
“[t]he test is an objective one—namely, whether ‘an ordinary, reasonable 
recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it 
as a threat of injury.’”127  This standard requires the government only to 
prove that the speaker knowingly made the statement.128  With only the 
“knowingly” intent requirement, conviction is essentially based on 
perceptions beyond the speaker’s control.129  If a reasonable person could 
construe the statement as a threat, then it was, regardless of what the 
speaker meant to communicate.130 
This test is used less frequently in true-threats cases than the 
reasonable-speaker test in general, and it is rarely used in presidential-
(discussing the Second Circuit true-threats test as applied in United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 
(2d Cir. 1976)). 
 125 Many circuits seem to be internally inconsistent in their choice of true-threats tests and, 
consequently, it is difficult to definitively assign a particular test to any one circuit.  There is 
certainly significant disagreement among scholars.  See, e.g., Crane, supra note 12, at 1244-45 
(assigning the reasonable-speaker test to the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
prior to Virginia v. Black); Gilbert, supra note 22, at 869-70 (assigning the reasonable-speaker test to 
the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits; citing Blakey & Murray, supra note 23); see also 
Rothman, supra note 20, at 304-05 (assigning the reasonable-speaker test to the First, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits).  To complicate things further, the courts may be just as confused as 
commentators.  See United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The First, Second, 
Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly adopted the reasonable 
person, objective standard discussed in Hoffman.” (citing United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 
1491 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 768 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vincent, 681 
F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982); Hart, 457 F.2d at 1090-91; Roy, 416 F.2d at 877-78)).  The tests 
designated to the various circuits in this Note were chosen because they seem the most consistent 
among scholars and courts. 
 126 United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1357 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 127 United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Maisonet, 484 F.2d at 1358). 
 128 Crane, supra note 12, at 1243-44. 
 129 Choosing to adopt the reasonable-speaker standard, the First Circuit noted, “This standard 
not only takes into account the factual context in which the statement was made, but also better 
avoids the perils that inhere in the ‘reasonable-recipient standard,’ namely that the jury will consider 
the unique sensitivity of the recipient.”  Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491. 
 130 The test has drawn substantial criticism.  Because the trier of fact is permitted to consider 
“context,” and that context usually includes the reaction of the listener, there is a risk that a jury will 
depart from objectivity and take into account the unique sensitivities of the recipient.  The First 
Circuit found it “particularly untenable that, were [it] to apply a standard guided from the 
perspective of the recipient, a defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous statement that 
the recipient may find threatening because of events not within the knowledge of the defendant.”  Id. 
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threat cases.131  This test is most applicable to federal threat statutes that 
prohibit interstate communications of threats, such as § 876(c).132  The 
test makes sense in that context, because when someone receives a 
threatening letter, the letter itself is generally all the recipient has to 
understand whether he or she is in danger from the threat. 
The district court in United States v. Lewis was one of the few 
courts to apply this test to the President.133  Lewis involved a man who 
sent five envelopes to various officials, including one to the President.134  
Each of the envelopes contained “an unidentified white powder” 
(presumably the defendant, Lewis, intended the recipients to believe it 
was anthrax, as the incident happened shortly after the post-September 
11 anthrax outbreaks), a cigarette butt, and a note that said either, “I were 
you, I’d change my attitude,” or “[i]t is on.”135  Since Lewis was charged 
under both sections 876 and 871, it is not surprising that the court applied 
the reasonable-recipient test.136  The district court simply consolidated 
the violations of both statutes and held that they were threatening 
communications because in context a reasonable recipient would 
interpret the letters as threats.137  However, aside from this isolated case, 
the reasonable-recipient standard is seldom (if ever) applied to threats 
against the President. 
3. Neutral-Perspective Objective Test 
Some courts have also applied a neutral-perspective objective 
test.138  The test does not depend on a particular viewpoint as with the 
other two objective standards, but instead asks if the statement could 
reasonably be construed as a threat.139  In United States v. Callahan, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied the neutral-perspective objective test to a 
 131 Crane, supra note 12, at 1248 (“[The neutral-reasonable-person test] was the least popular 
of the objective tests and enjoyed a devoted following only in the Fifth Circuit.”). 
 132 18 U.S.C.A. § 876(c) (Westlaw 2012) (“Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be 
delivered as aforesaid, any communication . . . containing any threat to kidnap any person or any 
threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both.”). 
 133 United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 557-58 (S.D.W. Va. 2002). 
 134 Id. at 549. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 557-58. 
 137 Id.  
 138 United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
 139 United States v. Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (“Considering 
this testimony in the light most favorable to the government, this statement [‘I will kill him’] meets 
the test of what amounts to a threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), i.e., ‘(this) communication “in its 
context” would “have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act 
according to its tenor.”’” (citation omitted)). 
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threatening letter sent directly to the Secret Service calling for the 
assassination of President Reagan.140  The court stated,  
The question is whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made the statement 
under such circumstances that a reasonable person would construe [it] 
as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to 
take the life of the persons named in the statute.141   
Under this standard, all the prosecution needs to prove is that the 
defendant knowingly made a statement that objectively manifests itself 
as threatening.142 
The Eleventh Circuit143 and the Fifth Circuit144 have applied this 
test to threats against the President as well as against private individuals, 
but they appear to stand alone.  Aside from a few anomalies, the 
reasonable-speaker test was the go-to presidential true-threat test before 
Bagdasarian.145 
4. Subjective Tests 
While the subjective-intent-to-threaten standard receives a fair share 
of scholarly attention,146 any discussion of it generally precedes a 
holding denying its validity.147  However, the discussion of the 
subjective-intent-to-threaten test is likely to be given new life in light of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bagdasarian to make a subjective intent 
 140 Callahan, 702 F.2d at 965. 
 141 Id. (citing United States v. Rogers, 488 F.2d 512, 513 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 422 U.S. 35 
(1975)). 
 142 Crane, supra note 12, at 1248. 
 143 See United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2003) (neutral standard 
applied to threat against private person); see also United States v. Pinkston, 338 F. App’x 801, 802 
(11th Cir. 2009) (neutral standard applied to threat against the President). 
 144 See United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1983) (neutral standard applied 
to threat against the President); see also United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(neutral standard applied to threat against a private individual). 
 145 Crane, supra note 12, at 1261-69 (discussing circuits’ true-threat interpretations following 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)). 
 146 See Blakey & Murray, supra note 23, at 1076-77 (advocating inclusion of subjective-intent 
element for true threats); Gilbert, supra note 22, at 872 (advocating use of a subjective-intent 
element for true threats); see also Crane, supra note 12, at 1237-43 (discussing the subjective-intent 
element generally). 
 147 See generally Crane, supra note 12, at 1239 (discussing the reluctance of lower courts to 
apply the subjective-intent-to-threaten standard); see also People v. Lowery, 257 P.3d 72, 78-81 
(Cal. 2011) (four-plus-page concurrence for the sole purpose of criticizing Bagdasarian’s decision to 
use a subjective-intent standard). 
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to threaten a de facto element of every threat statute.148  What was once 
only scholarly fodder now may be the next chapter in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  A story of humble beginnings, the subjective-intent-to-
threaten standard was first proffered by Justice Marshall in a concurring 
opinion in Rogers v. United States.149  The case involved a thirty-four-
year-old man named George Rogers with a ten-year history of 
alcoholism.150  Rogers wandered into a coffee shop and, in addition to 
claiming he was Jesus Christ, loudly exclaimed that he was going to 
Washington D.C. to “whip Nixon’s ass” or to “kill him to save the 
United States.”151  The police were called and Rogers reiterated his 
previous statements.152  He was subsequently charged with five counts of 
violating § 871(a).153 
Although the Court granted certiorari to clarify the confusion of the 
lower courts on the elements of § 871(a), the majority did not reach the 
issues of the true-threats doctrine.154  Instead, the Court reversed and 
remanded the case on the grounds of procedural error at trial.155  In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall agreed on the procedural error as 
grounds for reversal, but felt that the standard for analyzing statutes such 
as § 871(a) that criminalize threats against the President merited 
discussion.156 
Justice Marshall’s concurrence denounced both the objective-based 
test and the subjective-intent-to-carry-out-the-threat test, instead arguing 
that “the statute should be construed to proscribe all threats that the 
speaker intends to be interpreted as expressions of an intent to kill or 
injure the President.”157  He observed that the subjective-intent-to-carry-
out-the-threat standard failed to take into account that even an empty 
threat could disrupt the movements of the President.158  The statute was 
designed to prevent not only assassination attempts, but also the damage 
 148 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 149 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 150 Id. at 41 (majority opinion). 
 151 Id. at 41-42 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 152 Id. at 42. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 36 (majority opinion) (“[W]e granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict among 
the Courts of Appeals concerning the elements of the offense proscribed by § 871(a).  After full 
briefing and argument, however, we find it unnecessary to reach that question, since certain 
circumstances of petitioner’s trial satisfy us that the conviction must be reversed.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 155 Id. at 40. 
 156 Id. at 42-43 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 157 Id. at 47. 
 158 Id. (“A threat made with no present intention of carrying it out may still restrict the 
President’s movements and require a reaction from those charged with protecting the President.”). 
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caused by the threats themselves.159  Furthermore, the Secret Service 
likely responds to all serious threats as if they are intended to be carried 
out; otherwise investigation of the threats would seem pointless. 
As for the objective tests, Justice Marshall reasoned that an 
objective standard for true threats essentially imposes a negligence 
standard.160  Under an objective construction, “the defendant is subject to 
prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be interpreted as a 
threat, regardless of the speaker’s intention.”161  This construction holds 
defendants responsible for the effect of their statements on listeners.162  
The Court had been reluctant to infer that Congress intended a 
negligence standard when drafting criminal statutes.163  In particular, 
Justice Marshall felt the objective standard offended the First 
Amendment, cautioning that the Court “should be particularly wary of 
adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech.”164 
Justice Marshall’s analysis was based in statutory construction, 
relying largely on the legislative history of § 871 regarding the inclusion 
of its “willfulness” requirement.165  Quoting Representative Volstead, 
Marshall wrote, 
[I]n [Volstead’s] view, “(t)he word ‘willfully’ adds an intention to 
threaten, and distinguishes a case (in which the defendant does not 
intend to convey any threat).”  Without the requirement of willfulness, 
[Volstead] said, “a person might send innocently, without any 
intention to convey a threat at all, an instrument to a friend that 
contained a threat, and he would be guilty . . . .”166 
Punishing statements in situations such as the personal-
correspondence scenario Marshall quoted would appear to contradict 
First Amendment speech protections.  Statements from other members of 
Congress supported his argument as well, and Marshall ultimately 
concluded that “[t]he sponsors thus rather plainly intended the bill to 
require a showing that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. (“In essence, the objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard, charging the 
defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements on his listeners.”). 
 163 Id. (“We have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in 
criminal statutes.”). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 45-46. 
 166 Id. at 45 (citing 53 CONG. REC. 9378 (1916) (quoting statement of Rep. Volstead)). 
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of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the 
threat was a serious one.”167 
Although not exclusively a First Amendment true-threats argument, 
Marshall’s analysis was clearly concerned with balancing the interests of 
protecting the President from “enormously disruptive” threats that 
“involv[e] substantial costs to the Government,” with the notion that an 
overly broad intent standard could “have substantial costs in 
discouraging the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate that the 
First Amendment is intended to protect.”168  Both concerns are of great 
weight, although the balance seems to have been lost on most circuits 
prior to Bagdasarian.  Another Ninth Circuit case, United States v. 
Twine, was the only other appellate decision to analyze and employ a test 
similar to Marshall’s subjective-intent-to-threaten test.169  However, the 
Ninth Circuit’s use of this test in Twine is curious in relation to 
Marshall’s concurrence. 
The court in Twine held that the intent-to-threaten standard applied 
to sections 875 and 876, which criminalize threats transmitted interstate 
and sent through the mail, respectively.170  The court specifically pointed 
out that its decision in Roy to apply an objective test to the President 
would continue because “[a] threat against the President may cause 
substantial harm and is qualitatively different from a threat against a 
private citizen or other public official.”171  At this juncture, the Ninth 
Circuit remained content with the objective standard for the President, 
and weighed the unique concerns of the office in favor of protecting the 
President over speech, contrary to Marshall’s opinion on the issue.172 
Justice Marshall’s subjective-intent-to-threaten standard for § 871 
has not been completely lost on the lower courts.  In United States v. 
Frederickson, the Eighth Circuit applied this standard, albeit not by 
choice.173  At trial, the defendant, Frederickson, was found guilty 
pursuant to jury instructions adopting the construction of § 871 from 
Marshall’s concurring opinion in Rogers.174  Because no objection to the 
instructions was made at trial, the Eighth Circuit held Marshall’s 
 167 Id. at 46. 
 168 Id. at 47-48 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 169 United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. (“Because of the distinction drawn in Roy, between the President and private citizens, it 
is clear that the general intent to threaten required by § 871 is not sufficient for a conviction under §§ 
875(c) and 876.  These latter sections, concerned with private citizens and other public officials, 
logically require a showing of a subjective, specific intent to threaten.”). 
 173 United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1362-63 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 174 Id. 
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construction to be the “law of the case.”175  In particular, the court stated 
that in order to sustain a conviction under § 871, the government had to 
prove “that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature of his 
statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat 
was a serious one.”176 
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held its standard for true threats 
to be an objective one, although many of its cases consider a broad 
variety of contextual factors when measuring threatening statements.177  
However, it appears that the Eighth Circuit has been quietly applying 
Justice Marshall’s construction of § 871, seemingly unnoticed.178  
Despite the additional subjective-intent-to-threaten element being a part 
of the Frederickson opinion as a matter of circumstance, at least three 
subsequent Eighth Circuit panels have adhered to that standard,179 the 
latest of these cases decided after Bagdasarian.180  Each of these cases 
has held that, in addition to proving that a reasonable recipient would 
understand the speech as threatening, the government must prove that the 
defendant appreciated the threatening nature of his or her statements and 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 1363 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., 
concurring)). 
 177 See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622-23 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Our 
court is in the camp that views the nature of the alleged threat from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
recipient.  In United States v. Dinwiddie [76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996)], we emphasized the fact 
intensive nature of the true threat inquiry and held that a court must view the relevant facts to 
determine ‘whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses a 
determination or intent to injure presently or in the future.’” (some internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dinwiddie’s 
definition of true threat)). 
 178 There is relatively little commentary on this curious line of cases.  Thus far it appears that 
only one other commentator has noticed the issue.  See Craig Matthew Principe, Note, What Were 
They Thinking?: Competing Culpability Standards for Punishing Threats Made to the President, 7 
CRIM. L. BRIEF 39, 45 (2012).  The original holding in Frederickson was meant to be limited to that 
case, but it appears other cases have used the standard anyway, slipping through unnoticed.  See id. 
 179 United States v. Mann, No. 99–4115, 2000 WL 372243, at *1 (8th Cir. Apr. 12, 2000) 
(“As to whether the letter contained a threat, the government must prove that the defendant 
‘appreciated the threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression 
that the threat was a serious one.’” (quoting Frederickson, 601 F.2d at 1363)); United States v. 
Cvijanovich, 556 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The government must establish ‘that the defendant 
appreciated the threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression 
that the threat was a serious one . . . .  The proof of such intention must turn upon the circumstances 
under which the statement was made.’” (quoting Frederickson, 601 F.2d at 1363)); United States v. 
Christenson, 653 F.3d 697, 700-01 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A violation of § 871(a) involves both an 
objective and a subjective component.  The government must establish that a reasonable recipient, 
familiar with the context of the communication at issue, would interpret it as a threat, and that the 
defendant appreciated the threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the 
impression that the threat was a serious one.” (citing Cvijanovich, 556 F.3d at 863)). 
 180 Christenson, 653 F.3d at 700-01 (decided Sept. 2, 2011). 
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intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious 
one.181 
Frederickson and its progeny may be a bizarre anomaly.  The 
additional subjective-intent analysis appears to apply only to § 871, and 
as noted, the Eighth Circuit maintains that its true-threat test is an 
objective one.182  Justice Marshall premised the standard from Rogers on 
statutory construction,183 and perhaps the Eighth Circuit likewise reads 
“willfully” to require the government to show a subjective intent to 
threaten.  However, both Frederickson184 and United States v. 
Christenson  reference the requirement hand-in-hand with Watts and 
true threats.  None of the cases has offered any explanation why § 871 
should be treated differently than other threat statutes, nor do they seem 
to notice that they are an isolated minority.  The situation is quite odd, 
and the issue begs for an en banc review in the not-too-distant future. 
185
C. VIRGINIA V. BLACK: INTENTIONALLY UNHELPFUL 
Following Watts, the Supreme Court did not address the level of 
intent necessary to constitute a “true threat” until 2003 in Virginia v. 
Black, which in turn paved the way for the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Bagdasarian.186 
Black grouped together three convictions for violating a Virginia 
penal statute that made it a criminal offense to burn a cross with “an 
intent to intimidate a person or group of persons” and included a 
provision that “[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie 
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”187  
Focusing mainly on the prima-facie-evidence provision, the Court 
invalidated the statute, stating that it “ignores all of the contextual factors 
 181 Id.; Cvijanovich, 556 F.3d at 863; Mann, 2000 WL 372243, at *1. 
 182 United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Contrary to 
[defendant’s] contentions, we have adopted an objective standard for analyzing threats under 18 
U.S.C. § 876 and we have stated, ‘[i]f a reasonable recipient, familiar with the context of the 
communication, would interpret it as a threat, the issue should go to the jury.’” (quoting Martin v. 
United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1982))). 
 183 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 43-48 (1975) (Marshall, J. concurring) (discussing 
statutory history and proposing a construction of § 871 that accounts for the subjective intent of the 
speaker). 
 184 Frederickson, 601 F.2d at 1363 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) 
(per curiam)). 
 185 Christenson, 653 F.3d at 701 (“Watts demonstrates the limits of § 871(a), but no particular 
formulation of words is required to state a true [threat].”). 
 186 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 187 Id. at 347-48 (discussing a violation of VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423). 
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that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is 
intended to intimidate.”188 
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor provided a detailed 
historical account of cross-burning dating back to fourteenth-century 
Scottish tribes, highlighting the dual history of the practice as both “a 
statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity”189 and “as a 
message of intimidation, designed to inspire in the victim a fear of bodily 
harm.”190  According to the Court, the first of these reasons for cross-
burning is an exercise of constitutionally protected speech, while the 
latter is a proscribable threat.191  Thus, a statute such as the one at issue 
in Black, where the prima-facie-evidence provision precluded the jury 
from finding a defendant not guilty based on the speech/threat 
dichotomy, is invalid.192  With this in mind, the Court reiterated that only 
“true threats” are constitutionally proscribable, defining “true threats” as 
“encompass[ing] those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”193  
Though seemingly focusing on the speaker’s subjective intent, this 
definition bore no resemblance to any test previously used by the lower 
courts to measure a statement as a true threat.194  However, this 
definition subsequently provided the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s sharp 
departure from precedent in Bagdas 195
While the Court in Black offered a definition of true threats, the 
opinion failed considerably to clear up the differences that had developed 
following Watts.196  The preservation of the ambiguity surrounding the 
true-threat intent standard almost appears to have been by design, as the 
words “subjective” and “objective” are completely absent from the 
opinion.197  This could have been a result of the unique facts of the 
 188 Id. at 367. 
 189 Id. at 365-66. 
 190 Id. at 357. 
 191 Id. at 365. 
 192 Id. (“The prima facie evidence provision in this statute blurs the line between these two 
meanings of a burning cross.  As interpreted by the jury instruction, the provision chills 
constitutionally protected political speech because of the possibility that the Commonwealth will 
prosecute—and potentially convict—somebody engaging only in lawful political speech at the core 
of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”). 
 193 Id. at 359. 
 194 Id. 
 195 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the true 
threat requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in Black must be read 
into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”). 
 196 Crane, supra note 12, at 1256. 
 197 Black, 538 U.S. 343. 
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case—unlike many of the previous true-threats cases involving verbal or 
written statements, Black involved criminalization of the speech-like 
conduct of cross-burning.198  However, even with that distinction in 
mind, it seems unusual that in light of lower courts’ disagreement being 
framed in terms of subjective or objective intent, the Court essentially 
ignored that dichotomy in the only true-threat case to be decided on the 
merits since 1969.199 
D. POST-BLACK: AFTERMATH OF UNCERTAINTY 
Black’s definition of true threats fits poorly within the lower court’s 
previously established true-threat framework.  This incongruity may 
stem from the particular facts of Black, which involved threatening 
expressive conduct as opposed to the usual threatening statements that 
are the subject of most other true-threat cases.200  As one commentator 
has noted, “Because the Court’s focus was not on carefully defining true 
threats, but on providing a basis for its content discrimination analysis, 
the Court left a variety of viable interpretations in its wake” on the issue 
of intent.201  Whatever the Supreme Court’s intended purpose for the 
definition, it has nonetheless been subsequently analyzed by the lower 
courts in the context of the proper intent standard for gauging true 
threats.202 
Despite Black’s apparent shift in focus to the speaker’s subjective 
intent to threaten, the majority of lower courts, many of them noting that 
Black did not expressly purport to overrule any established precedent, 
continued to apply some form of the objective test to true threats.203  
Conversely, the Tenth204 and Fourth205 Circuits applied the subjective-
intent-to-threaten test in opinions that specifically addressed the Supreme 
 198 See id. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opining that the Virginia statute “prohibits only 
conduct, not expression”). 
 199 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
 200 Black, 538 U.S. at 348-50. 
 201 Crane, supra note 12, at 1256 (providing an analysis of the element of intent for “true 
threats” in general, particularly a discussion of the possible interpretations of Black’s definition of 
true threats.). 
 202 Id. at 1261. 
 203 Id. 
 204 United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (“An intent to threaten is 
enough; the further intent to carry out the threat is unnecessary.” (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 360)). 
 205 United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 2007) (“True threats have been 
characterized by the Supreme Court as statements made by a speaker who ‘means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group.’” (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359)).  The opinion then proceeds to analyze subjective factors 
of intent by comparing the facts to Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) and 
United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447 (4th Cir. 2004).  Bly, 510 F.3d at 459. 
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Court’s definition of true threats from Black.  Of course, both sides felt 
their standard was correct in light of the new definition of true threats.206 
The Ninth Circuit appears to have had the hardest time with the 
definition from Black and in 2005 applied the objective reasonable-
speaker test in two cases involving threats against the President,207 while 
holding in a third case that same year that “[t]he clear import of this 
definition is that only intentional threats are criminally punishable 
consistently with the First Amendment.”208  Later that same year, the 
Ninth Circuit noted this discrepancy in United States v. Stewart, but 
declined to rule on the issue in that case because the threatening 
statements at issue would have violated of the particular statute under 
either standard.209  Against this background of uncertainty, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Bagdasarian departed from the majority of federal 
court of appeals precedent, including some of its own, and held the 
“subjective-intent-to-threaten” standard to be required part of the 
analysis for all cases concerning criminal threats.210 
 206 See Magleby, 420 F.3d at 1139 (“Unprotected by the Constitution are threats that 
communicate the speaker’s intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against identifiable 
individuals.  The threat must be made ‘with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359)); see also United States v. Ellis, No. 
CR.02-687-1, 2003 WL 22271671, at *4  (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2003) (“Defendant invites us to interpret 
the above statement to require that the speaker of a ‘true threat’ have a subjective intent to place 
those hearing the words in fear that violence would be done to the President.  We decline the 
invitation.  The Supreme Court’s statement [in Black] is entirely consistent with the Third Circuit’s 
[objective] interpretation of § 871.”). 
 207 United States v. Lincoln, 403 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Romo, 413 
F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 208 United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 209 United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We are not fully 
convinced that Romo properly distinguished Cassel, or that Romo’s continued use of the objective 
‘true threat’ definition is consistent with Black’s subjective ‘true threat’ definition.  Nonetheless, we 
need not decide whether the objective or subjective ‘true threat’ definition should apply here.  That 
is because the evidence establishes that Stewart’s statement was a ‘true threat’ under either definition 
and thus is not protected by the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 210 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because of 
comments made in some of our cases, we begin by clearing up the perceived confusion as to whether 
a subjective or objective analysis is required when examining whether a threat is criminal under 
various threat statutes and the First Amendment.”). 
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III. BREAKING AWAY: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S NEW DIRECTION 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. 
BAGDASARIAN 
On October 22, 2008, shortly before Barack Obama was elected 
President, Walter Edward Bagdasarian joined a “Yahoo! Finance-
American International Group” message board under the username 
“californiaradial.”211  At 1:15 a.m., Bagdasarian posted the statement, 
“Re: Obama fk the niggar, he will have a 50 cal in the head soon.”212  
Twenty minutes later, he posted “shoot the nig country fkd for another 4 
years+, what nig has done ANYTHING right???? long term???? never in 
history, except sambos.”213  Bagdasarian also posted comments claiming 
he was intoxicated while he was making these statements, a claim he 
reiterated at trial.214 
At least four individuals responded negatively to these posts.215  A 
person using the username “Dan757x” replied to one of Bagdasarian’s 
statements with “[y]ou’ve been reported by me, a good ole’ white 
boy.”216  “Brown.romaine” posted “I am reporting this post to the Secret 
Service.”217  Eventually, retired Air Force officer John Base did in fact 
report Bagdasarian’s “shoot the nig” statement to the Los Angeles Field 
Office of the United States Secret Service.218  Base supplied the Secret 
Service with the username “californiaradial” as well as an Internet link to 
the posting.219 
The Secret Service agent located the posting and obtained the 
subscriber information for “californiaradial@yahoo.com” as well as the 
Internet Protocol history for the account.220  With this information, the 
Secret Service was able to track the Internet Protocol address to 
Bagdasarian’s home in La Mesa, California.221  A month after 
 211 Id. at 1115. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 1115 n.10 (“burp more VINOOOOOOOO. . . . Listen up crybaby ole white boy, I 
was drunk.”). 
 215 Id. at 1129 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 216 Id. at 1124. 
 217 Id. at 1125. 
 218 Id. at 1115 (majority opinion). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 1115-16. 
 221 Id. at 1116. 
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Bagdasarian made the statements about Obama on the message board 
two Secret Service agents visited his home and interviewed him.222 
Bagdasarian admitted making the statements from his home 
computer to the agents.223  When asked, he informed the agents he had 
weapons in the home, one of which was located on a nearby shelf.224  
Four days later, the agents returned to Bagdasarian’s home with a search 
warrant and found six firearms, one of which was a Remington model 
700ML .50 caliber muzzle-loading rifle, as well as .50 caliber 
ammunition.225 
During a search of the hard drive from Bagdasarian’s home 
computer, the agents found several emails he sent on Election Day 
2008.226  Among these emails was one with the subject line “Re: And so 
it begins” which contained the text “Pistol? ? ? Dude, Josh needs to get 
us one of these, just shoot the nigga’s car and POOF!” and a link to a 
website advertising a large caliber rifle.227  Also sent that day was an 
email under the same subject heading that contained the statement 
“Pistol . . . plink plink plink Now when you use a 50 cal on a nigga car 
you get this,” with a link to a video that showed a propane tank, a pile of 
debris and two cars being blown up.228 
The Secret Service filed a criminal complaint and the government 
subsequently filed a superseding indictment charging Bagdasarian with 
two counts of violating § 879(a)(3).229  The parties stipulated to the 
above facts, and the case was tried before a district judge, who found 
Bagdasarian guilty on both counts.230  Bagdasarian then appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit, which overturned his conviction because his statements 
did not objectively or subjectively qualify as a true threat.231 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INTENT 
REQUIREMENT 
In Bagdasarian, Judge Reinhardt, joined by Chief Judge Kozinski, 
wrote for the panel majority and attacked the question of the proper 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
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standard of intent head-on.232  After noting the inconsistency within the 
Ninth Circuit itself regarding the subjective/objective intent standards 
and particular threat statutes, the court quickly dismissed the issue as “a 
false dichotomy.”233  Instead, “[t]he issue is actually whether, as to a 
threat prosecuted under a particular threat statute, only a subjective 
analysis need be applied or whether both a subjective and an objective 
analysis is required.”234 
Following the declaration of its bold new stance, the court went on 
to distinguish § 879(a)(3) from § 871(a), stating that the former required 
both an objective and subjective analysis, while the latter previously 
required only an objective analysis.235  However, in either case, the 
“analysis in its most important respect is ultimately the same: In order to 
affirm a conviction under any threat statute that criminalizes pure speech, 
we must find sufficient evidence that the speech at issue constitutes a 
‘true threat,’ as defined in Black.”236  Thus, the Ninth Circuit declared, 
Because the true threat requirement is imposed by the Constitution, 
the subjective test set forth in Black must be read into all threat 
statutes that criminalize pure speech.  The difference is that with 
respect to some threat statutes, we require that the purported threat 
meet an objective standard in addition, and for some we do not.237 
As previously noted, regardless of precedent treating § 871 and § 
879 differently, the statutes now stand on the same footing by 
proscribing objectively threatening statements a speaker subjectively 
intends to be understood as threats.238 
C. BAGDASARIAN: APPLYING BOTH STANDARDS 
The subjective standard that the Ninth Circuit applied in 
Bagdasarian took into account the dubious and incredible nature of the 
defendant’s statements.239  Even an objective look at the statements 
 232 Id. at 1116-17 (“Because of comments made in some of our cases, we begin by clearing up 
the perceived confusion as to whether a subjective or objective analysis is required when examining 
whether a threat is criminal under various threat statutes and the First Amendment.”). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 1117. 
 235 Id. at 1116-17. 
 236 Id. at 1117. 
 237 Id. 
 238 See also discussion supra Part I. 
 239 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1123 (“Taking the two message board postings in the context of 
all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Bagdasarian had the subjective intent to threaten a 
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simply shows an ignorant and angry man who, even if he so intended, 
could hardly be expected to actually effectuate an assassination of then-
presidential candidate Barack Obama.  As a serious candidate for 
presidential office, Obama deserved the same protections as an acting 
President, but so too should statements about him be afforded significant 
constitutional protection.  
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Objective-Intent Standard 
Having concluded that true-threat analysis for a violation of § 
879(a)(3) required both an objective and subjective element, the majority 
set out to apply the standard to Bagdasarian’s statements.240  For the 
objective standard, the court applied the reasonable-listener test and then 
noted three factors upon which a fact-finder should base the 
determination: “the surrounding events, the listeners’ reaction, and 
whether the words are conditional.”241  The court cited Gordon for these 
factors, and Gordon’s interpretation of the standard is traceable straight 
to Watts.242 
The court took a rather technical approach to finding Bagdasarian’s 
statements insufficient under the objective standard.  First, the court 
relied on the dictionary,243 stating that “a threat in the ordinary meaning 
of the word” is “an expression of an intention to inflict . . . injury . . . on 
another.”244  With this definition in mind, the court concluded that 
neither of the statements for which Bagdasarian was charged constituted 
a “threat.”245  Relying largely on the grammatical form of Bagdasarian’s 
statements, the court characterized the “Obama fk the niggar” post as a 
prediction that Obama “will have a 50 cal in the head soon” and, as such, 
presidential candidate.  For the same reasons that his statements fail to meet the subjective element 
of § 879, given any reasonable construction of the words in his postings, those statements do not 
constitute a ‘true threat,’ and they are therefore protected speech under the First Amendment.”). 
 240 Id. at 1118 (“Because § 879(a)(3), the provision at issue here, requires subjective intent as 
a matter of statutory construction, see [United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 
1992)], it necessarily incorporates the constitutional inquiry commanded by Black: Did the speaker 
subjectively intend the speech as a threat?”). 
 241 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1119. 
 242 Id. (citing Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117). 
 243 Surprisingly, few courts had relied on the dictionary definition of “threat” before 
Bagdasarian. 
 244 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2382 (1976)).  It seems odd that Judge Reinhardt used a dictionary from 1976, as 18 
U.S.C. § 879 was added in 1982 and this case was decided in 2011.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 879 
(Westlaw 2012); United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992).  Presumably the 
dictionary definition of “threat” has not changed significantly over the years so the year of the 
dictionary is of little consequence anyway. 
 245 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1119. 
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the statement “convey[ed] no explicit or implicit threat on the part of 
Bagdasarian that he himself will kill or injure Obama.”246  Similarly, the 
court felt that Bagdasarian’s second statement, “shoot the nig” was not a 
threat but “instead an imperative intended to encourage others to take 
violent action, if not simply an expression of rage or frustration.”247  
Although the court admitted that neither statement was conditional, it 
argued that “the meaning of the words [was] absolutely plain.  They do 
not constitute a threat and do not fall within the offense punished by the 
statute.”248 
Few other courts have made such narrow and technical distinctions 
when evaluating threatening statements.  Many statements that fall short 
of a straightforward “I will kill/injure/harm the President” have been 
nonetheless considered threats in the context of both sections 871 and 
879.  For example, in United States v. Hoffman, the defendant sent a 
letter to President Reagan that said “Ronnie, Listen Chump! Resign or 
You’ll Get Your Brains Blown Out” accompanied with “a crude drawing 
of a pistol with a bullet emerging from the barrel.”249  This statement was 
clearly “conditional” on Reagan’s failure to resign, as well as 
“predictive,” but the Seventh Circuit dismissed these factors, reasoning 
that “[a] logical reading of the cases construing [§] 871 clearly 
establishes that the conditional nature of a statement does not make the 
statement any less of a ‘true threat’ simply because a contingency may be 
involved.”250 
The Hoffman majority cited some authority for its proposition that 
the conditional nature of a statement is irrelevant, but that notion 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Watts, in which 
the Court placed significant weight on the conditional nature of Watts’s 
statements.251  Furthermore, the objective standard has proven to be quite 
technical throughout the history of its application.252  Even though the 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 711 (citing United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Moncrief, 462 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jasick, 252 F. 931 (E.D. Mich. 
1918)). 
 251 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 252 See United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2004) (comparing the 
conditional nature of the statement, “[i]f George Bush refuses to see the truth and uphold the 
Constitution,” to “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J.” from Watts, 394 U.S. at 706, and finding the former statement “conditional” but not 
“expressly conditional”); see also Hoffman, 806 F.2d at 711 (discussing disagreement between the 
majority and dissent over the importance of the “hyper-technical” conditional-nature factor, with the 
majority denouncing the factor outright and the dissent arguing to overturn a conviction based on the 
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objective test allows for consideration of the context in which a 
statement was made, at its heart it hinges on the words themselves being 
objectively threatening.253 
The next factor to be analyzed was the context in which 
Bagdasarian’s statements were made.254  Because the court concluded 
that Bagdasarian’s statements were not objectively “threats,” it largely 
bypassed the context factor by stating: 
When our law punishes words, we must examine the surrounding 
circumstances to discern the significance of those words’ utterance, 
but must not distort or embellish their plain meaning so that the law 
may reach them.  Here, the meaning of the words is absolutely plain.  
They do not constitute a threat and do not fall within the offense 
punished by the statute.255 
After dispensing with the need to independently analyze any of the 
circumstances surrounding the statement, the court dismissed the 
government’s argument that Bagdasarian’s anonymity over the Internet 
could influence the recipient’s sense of alarm.256  As the majority pointed 
out, the government offered no evidence to support the argument that 
statements made in circumstances of anonymity might be perceived as 
any more or less dangerous.257  Further, the court opined that any 
influence Bagdasarian’s anonymity had on his audience was blunted by 
the fact that his statements were made on a non-violent financial message 
board.258  As far as the Ninth Circuit was concerned, the only evidence 
presented concerning the reactions of the readers amounted to less than a 
handful of people saying they were going to call someone and only one, 
who happened to be a retired military officer, who actually did.259 
conditional nature of the defendant’s statement “if the President does not resign, he will get his 
brains blown out”). 
 253 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 254 Id. at 1120. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. (“We grant that in some circumstances a speaker’s anonymity could influence a 
listener’s perception of danger.  But the Government offers no support for its contention that the 
imperative ‘shoot the nig’ or the prediction that Obama ‘will have a 50 cal in the head soon’ would 
be more rather than less likely to be regarded as a threat under circumstances in which the speaker’s 
identity is unknown.”). 
 258 Id. at 1121 (“Whatever the effect, in other circumstances, of anonymity on a reasonable 
interpretation of Bagdasarian’s statements, the financial message board to which he posted them is a 
non-violent discussion forum that would tend to blunt any perception that statements made there 
were serious expressions of intended violence.”). 
 259 Id. (“[T]he only possible evidence is that three or four discussion board members wrote 
that they planned to alert authorities to the ‘shoot the nig’ posting, although only one reader, Air 
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Before moving on to the subjective analysis, the court addressed the 
government’s contention that Bagdasarian’s possession of a .50 caliber 
rifle at the time the statement was made and the emails he later sent to 
his friends with videos of cars exploding were additional evidence that 
his statements might reasonably be interpreted as a threat.260  However, 
the readers of the postings for which Bagdasarian was charged were 
unaware of these facts, and the court dismissed them as irrelevant to an 
objective test.261  These facts might bear some relevance to whether 
Bagdasarian’s statements constituted true threats, but they were not 
relevant to the objective analysis.262 
Bagdasarian evinces the objective standard’s weakness.  Many of 
the court’s findings were semantic in nature,263 highlighting the objective 
standard’s tendency to make violations of sections 871 and 879 
“technical offenses.”264  Especially in the context of Internet postings, 
where the tone and mannerisms of the speaker are unknown, an objective 
analysis turns almost entirely on the exact words used.265  Dissecting 
statements as predictive, imperative, conditional, or some other 
technical/linguistic analysis of the language used in an allegedly 
threatening statement makes a mockery of both the statutes themselves 
and the First Amendment.   Semantics aside, the court next moved to 
the heart of the analysis—the application of the subjective-intent 
standard. 
266
Force Officer Base, actually did.”).  The dissent in the case, authored by Judge Wardlaw, argued that 
the responsive postings represented the “‘[m]ost telling’ evidence that a reasonable person would 
have perceived Bagdasarian’s messages as a threat.”  Id. at 1129 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  The majority disagreed and felt that this mischaracterized the postings 
because none of the responses mentioned a threat and thus could have been found offensive by their 
authors for any number of reasons not proscribed by § 879.  Id. at 1121 (majority opinion).  There 
was no reason to assume that negative reactions to the posts meant that the listeners interpreted the 
statements as a threat.  Id.  Many likely read the post, a few voiced protests, and only one acted.  Id.  
One man’s actions do not necessarily represent a reasonable person’s interpretation.  See id. 
(“[N]one of the responses said anything about a threat.  Their authors may well have thought that 
Bagdasarian’s messages were impermissible or offensive for some other reason or that they 
encouraged racism or violence.”). 
 260 Id. at 1121-22 (majority opinion). 
 261 Id. at 1122.  Judge Reinhardt seemed almost sarcastic when writing off the Government’s 
contentions, giving them short service and italicizing “objective,” both seemingly to highlight a 
shortcoming of the objective-only standard. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. at 1119-20. 
 264 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 265 See Strauss, supra note 23 (discussing issues related to a lack of context and other factors 
for threats made over the Internet). 
 266 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 46 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The danger of making § 871 a mere 
‘technical offense’ or making ‘innocent acts punishable’ was clear to the sponsors of the Act; their 
concerns should continue to inform the application of the statute today.”). 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/6
2013] United States v. Bagdasarian 89 
 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Subjective-Intent Standard 
In analyzing whether Bagdasarian’s statements evidenced a 
subjective intent to threaten, the majority contended that the statements 
themselves failed to show any such intent for the same reasons they were 
insufficient to meet the objective standard.267  “[H]e will have a .50 cal in 
the head soon” was not a threat on its own because it did not express any 
notion that Bagdasarian himself would be the one attempting to injure 
Obama.268  Nor was “shoot the nig” evidence of a threat but rather 
“expresse[d] the imperative that some unknown third party should take 
violent action.”269  Bagdasarian’s statements alone did not support a 
finding that he intended to threaten the President.270  At most, one was 
wishful thinking and the other was a call for someone else to act, but 
neither was meant to “communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual.”271 
Just as with the objective analysis, a court must analyze the alleged 
threats in context to determine the subjective state of mind of the 
speaker.272  It is here that facts unknown to the other message board 
participants, but later uncovered in the Secret Service’s post-threat 
investigation of Bagdasarian, were properly analyzed.273  The majority 
conceded that evidence of Bagdasarian’s gun possession was probative 
to his subjective intent, but reasoned that while relevant, it was “not 
determinative of the defendant’s intent” and “just one among many 
pieces of evidence relevant to the language and context of the threats.”274 
The Ninth Circuit itself produced the leading case finding evidence 
of gun possession relevant and admissible for determining subjective 
intent to threaten, in United States v. Sutcliffe.275  That case also involved 
Internet postings, although Sutcliffe’s statements were made in the 
context of a disgruntled defendant creating a website for the purpose of 
lashing out at a former employer and co-workers.276  Clearly, such a 
local and personal situation differs contextually from a posting on a 
finance message board about the President of the United States.  
Threatening one’s co-workers—people whom a speaker would have a 
 267 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1122. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at 1122 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). 
 272 Id. at 1123. 
 273 Id.; see discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 274 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1123. 
 275 United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 276 Id. 
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personal relationship with and who likely live and work within a close 
proximity to the speaker—is vastly different from threatening the 
President.  Most people’s co-workers are not protected by a branch of 
law enforcement created primarily for their protection277 or travel so 
often they have two pers 278
Despite the weapons’ relevance, the court found Bagdasarian’s gun 
possession distinguishable from that in Sutcliffe.279  Regarding Sutcliffe, 
the court noted “the first-person and highly specific character of 
messages such as ‘I will kill you,’ ‘I’m now armed,’ and ‘You think 
seeing [your license plate number posted on my website] is bad . . . trust 
us when we say [it] can get much, much, worse. . . .’”280  Bagdasarian’s 
statements never expressed any notion that he planned to carry out the 
threat.281  Consequently, his possession of a rifle was only slightly 
relevant to his subjective intent, still short of evidencing a true threat.282  
He may have mentioned a caliber of ammunition in one of his posts, and 
he happened to have a rifle capable of firing, but at no point did he say 
anything along the lines of shooting that ammunition himself.283 
The later emails and videos Bagdasarian sent to his friends were 
found to be of equally low value as evidence of his subjective intent to 
threaten.284  The court viewed these materials simply as additional 
information “that Bagdasarian may have believed would tend to 
encourage the email’s recipient to take violent action against Obama” 
and such “incitement . . . does not qualify as an offense under § 
879(a)(3).”   Bagdasarian may have just thought that the emails were 
funny.  While his humor was tasteless to say the least, Bagdasarian no 
doubt intended only his like-minded friends to see the emails.  These 
communications evidenced Bagdasarian’s ignorance and affinity for 
285
 277 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3056(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (“Under the direction of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following persons: 
The President, the Vice President (or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of 
President), the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect.”). 
 278 Air Force One, THE WHITE HOUSE, www.whitehouse.gov/about/air-force-one (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2012) (“Capable of refueling midair, Air Force One has unlimited range and can carry the 
President wherever he needs to travel. The onboard electronics are hardened to protect against an 
electromagnetic pulse, and Air Force One is equipped with advanced secure communications 
equipment, allowing the aircraft to function as a mobile command center in the event of an attack on 
the United States.”). 
 279 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1123. 
 280 Id. (citing Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d at 951-52). 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 1115-16. 
 284 Id. at 1123 (“Similarly, the Election Day emails do little to advance the prosecution’s 
case.”). 
 285 Id. 
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munitions, but not his intent to truly threaten presidential candidate 
Obama. 
The majority’s conclusion is of course just one of many possible 
ways to read Bagdasarian’s statements, and within the Bagdasarian court 
itself reasonable minds disagreed as to the application of the subjective-
intent standard, although not the standard’s propriety.286  Most 
importantly, the majority’s holding allowed for consideration of all the 
relevant information, particularly Bagdasarian’s state of mind.287  Many 
defendants whose statements were tested solely under an objective 
standard were people more troubled than the statements they made.   
The law should not criminally punish those who speak thoughtlessly.  
Especially in the context of the President—arguably the most political 
figure on the planet—people need the freedom to speak without fear of 
criminal reprisal.  Courts should protect the speech of citizens and leave 
concerns of presidential safety to the Secret Service whenever possible. 
288
 
IV. WHY THE OBJECTIVE TEST FAILS 
A. OBJECTIVE: WHO CARES WHAT THE SPEAKER WAS THINKING? 
The shortcomings of applying only an objective test can be seen in 
presidential true-threats cases that preceded Bagdasarian.  Numerous 
convictions have been upheld in circumstances where the facts indicate 
that the accused was guilty of little more than a hyperbolic expression of 
political sentiments.  Drunks,289 incarcerated persons,290 and the mentally 
 286 Id. at 1124 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I concur fully with the 
majority’s analysis of the law of ‘true threats.’  The First Amendment prohibits the criminalization 
of pure speech unless the government proves that the speaker specifically intended to threaten.  
Thus, in every threats case the Constitution requires that the subjective test is met.  In this case, the 
statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3), also requires that a reasonable person would foresee that his 
statement would be perceived as a threat to harm a presidential candidate.  Because there is 
sufficient evidence supporting a finding of objective intent, and because even under the heightened 
standard of review that we apply to constitutional facts, the subjective intent requirement is also met, 
I conclude there is sufficient evidence to find Mr. Bagdasarian guilty of threatening harm against 
then-presidential candidate Barack Obama.”). 
 287 Id. at 1122-23 (majority opinion). 
 288 See United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 767 (2d Cir. 1994) (suicidal prison inmate 
under psychiatric supervision convicted under § 871); United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 829-30 
(10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (psychiatric patient on medication precluded from using defense of 
diminished capacity when court applied an objective test). 
 289 United States v. Rogers, 488 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming § 871 conviction of 
alcoholic who made threatening statements while intoxicated), rev’d on other grounds, 422 U.S. 35 
(1975). 
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unstable291 have all been found guilty of felonies for threatening the 
President because an objective test fails to consider the mental state of 
the speaker.292  The objective test leads to criminalizing far too much 
speech, nearly to the point of making threats against the President “a 
mere technical offense.”293  Statements charged as threats are only 
words, words that mean little without accounting for the intention of the 
person who spoke
Furthermore, threatening statements made about the President by 
average citizens are inherently incredible in nature.  The President lives 
in a protective bubble created by the Secret Service and the demands of 
the office.  Most Americans could get no closer to the President than 
could someone on the FBI’s Most Wanted list.  The justifications for 
proscribing threats against the President—of protecting his or her 
movements and conserving the resources of the Secret Service—begin to 
lose their force when ludicrous statements made by troubled individuals 
are charged as threats.  For example, it is unlikely that the threat against 
the President made by the prison inmate in Johnson294 had any effect on 
the President’s movements, and it is doubtful that the Secret Service 
expended significant resources investigating a drunk who stated that he 
planned to walk to Washington D.C. and “whip Nixon’s ass.”295 
 290 United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2004) (habitually incarcerated 
individual convicted under § 871 for statements made in a letter sent from prison); Johnson, 14 F.3d 
at 767 (suicidal prison inmate under psychiatric supervision convicted under § 871). 
 291 Crews, 781 F.2d at 829-30 (psychiatric patient convicted under § 871 while on large 
dosages of antidepressants). 
 292 Crane, supra note 12, at 1236 (“[T]he defenses available to a defendant depend on which 
test [objective or subjective] the court applies.  For instance, a defense that the speaker did not intend 
for the statement to be threatening would not be permitted in an objective test jurisdiction because it 
would be irrelevant.  Similarly, defenses based on mental defect or voluntary intoxication, which are 
available in most jurisdictions as a defense to specific intent crimes, would only be available when a 
court applies a subjective test, not an objective test.”). 
 293 As Justice Marshall pointed out, the possibility that § 871 would go too far in 
criminalizing speech was at the forefront of the minds that drafted the statute.  Rogers v. United 
States, 422 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“‘If you make it a mere technical 
offense, you do not give him much of a chance when he comes to answer before a court and jury.  I 
do not think we ought to be too anxious to convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly.  I think it 
ought to be a willful expression of an intent to carry out a threat against the Executive . . . .’  The 
sponsors thus rather plainly intended the bill to require a showing that the defendant appreciated the 
threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was 
a serious one.” (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting 53 CONG. REC. 9378 (1916) (statement of 
Rep. Webb))). 
 294 See Johnson, 14 F.3d at 767. 
 295 See Rogers, 422 U.S. at 41. 
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B. OBJECTIVE: CRAZY IS NO DEFENSE 
The essential difference between applying the subjective or 
objective tests lies in the evidence that may be proffered as to intent.  
From an objective standpoint, a defendant’s state of mind is essentially 
irrelevant if a reasonable speaker or listener would have perceived the 
statement as a threat.296  Again, as Justice Marshall pointed out,  
Under the objective construction . . . the defendant is subject to 
prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be interpreted as a 
threat, regardless of the speaker’s intention. . . . [T]he objective 
interpretation embodies a negligence standard, charging the defendant 
with responsibility for the effect of his statements on his listeners.297 
C. APPLICATIONS LEADING TO UNDESIRABLE RESULTS 
A few illustrations may explain the negative effects of an objective 
true-threat standard.  In Johnson, an incarcerated man who had been 
moved to a psychiatric facility for thoughts of suicide and claims of 
hearing voices was charged and convicted under both § 871 and § 879 
for threatening the lives of then-President George H. W. Bush and 
former President Reagan.298  The Second Circuit applied the objective 
reasonable-speaker test, reading the statutes as general- as opposed to 
specific-intent crimes, thereby preventing the defendant from introducing 
evidence of his diminished capacity.299  Apparently, the voices in his 
head were credible enough to be a threat to presidential security. 
In Rogers, both the District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit applied an objective standard and 
convicted a drunk claiming to be Jesus Christ for saying he was going to 
walk to Washington from Louisiana (because he did not like cars) to 
“whip Nixon’s ass.”300  The case was ultimately overturned due to 
procedural error.301  Apparently, after deliberating for two hours, the jury 
sent the trial judge a note after asking if they could find the defendant 
“[g]uilty as charged with extreme mercy of the Court.”302  Five minutes 
 296 See Johnson, 14 F.3d at 771 (holding a diminished-capacity defense inapposite to § 871 
and § 879 under an objective standard, because the government was not required to show the 
defendant’s subjective intent). 
 297 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 47. 
 298 Johnson, 14 F.3d at 767. 
 299 Id. at 771. 
 300 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 41-43. 
 301 Id. at 41. 
 302 Id. at 36. 
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after the trial court’s answer in the affirmative, the jury returned a verdict 
of “guilty with extreme mercy.”303  On review, the Supreme Court felt 
the quick return of the verdict following the note, coupled with the trial 
judge’s failure to explain that a jury’s sentencing recommendation was 
non-binding, led an otherwise hung jury to impermissibly compromise 
on a limited verdict.304  It appears as though the jury felt compelled to 
find Rogers’s statements threatening under the objective standard, but 
hesitated to impose the full effect of a guilty verdict on a man who posed 
no real threat to the President.305 
In United States v. Hanna, the District Court for Nevada convicted a 
man under § 871 for mailing and delivering photocopied fliers, none of 
which were delivered to the President or any federal agencies.306  The 
fliers read like “Wanted” posters with statements such as “William 
Jefferson Blythe 3rd, Mr. buzzard’s feast, WANTED For MURDER, 
DEAD OR ALIVE.”307  The defendant argued that § 871 was 
unconstitutionally overbroad in the absence of a specific intent to 
threaten, which the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected.308  The court, however, 
reversed the ruling based on procedural error, because the state had used 
experts such as Secret Service agents to assess whether the statements 
constituted credible threats to the life of the President.309  According to 
 303 Id. at 40. 
 304 Id. at 39-41. 
 305 The Fifth Circuit’s opinion noted that the trial court properly rejected an “intention to carry 
out” requirement in § 871, and noted that the jury instructions given by the trial court were in line 
with Roy v. United States, which used the objective, “reasonable speaker” test.  United States v. 
Rogers, 488 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (citing Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th 
Cir. 1969)), rev’d on other grounds, 422 U.S. 35 (1975). 
 306 United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 307 The court describes three other documents Hanna produced as well.  Id.  One “contains the 
words ‘KILL THE BEAST’ in handwritten capitals along the top of the page.  Underneath this 
heading are a few handwritten comments as well as two stick figures which apparently represent 
President Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton.  Above the President figure is the number ‘666’ 
and the name ‘willie jeffer jackal.’  The stick figure with the name ‘HILLARY’ above it is pointing 
at the President figure and appears to be saying ‘you said you danced all night.’”  Id.  Another 
document included “the words ‘WANTED FOR MURDER’ printed in large, bold capitals, taking up 
approximately a third of the page.  Directly below is the picture of President Clinton at Justice 
Ginsburg’s swearing-in.  Next to the picture, there is a handwritten comment, ‘17 little Angels 
Murdered by Beast Blythe and his 666 Molesters.’  An arrow is drawn from the phrase ‘Beast 
Blythe’ to the President’s picture.  Below the picture in mostly capitals are the words, ‘WILLIAM 
JEFFERSON BLYTHE 3rd, alias Willie the Clinton, alias Rev.  HIV 3rd, AND His 666 
MOLESTERS, DEAD OR ALIVE.’”  Id. at 1083.  The fourth document the court describes “reads 
along the top, in handwritten lettering, ‘All filth herein will be hanged by the feet and their throat 
slit.’  Below is a list of approximately thirty names, including ‘sweet willie Blythe,’ and a variety of 
other handwritten comments.  These messages are written on the face of a formal court document 
entitled, ‘Petition for Court Ordered Involuntary Admission.’”  Id. 
 308 Id. at 1085. 
 309 Id. at 1085-88. 
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the court, the jury could be induced to judge the statements of the 
defendant from the standpoint of highly trained law enforcement 
personnel as opposed to that of a reasonable, ordinary person.310  
Regardless of that possibility, neither standpoint takes into account the 
mindset of the speaker himself or herself. 
Perhaps most telling of the relative lunacy of the statements in 
Hanna is the fact that one of these documents had been used in a court 
filing to have the defendant, Hanna, involuntarily committed to 
psychiatric treatment a year prior to his arrest.311  A conviction on the 
facts of Hanna would be imposing a felony conviction for what should 
have been no more than a citation for littering or sending garbage 
through the mail.  For fear of real or perceived harm to the President, the 
court was ready to lock up a man armed with nothing more than paper 
and crude jokes. 
Under the objective standard, the delusional ramblings of mentally 
unstable individuals are not safe from prosecution if a reasonable person 
could be inclined to believe the statements were threatening.  It is not 
likely that there was truly a threat of actual or even possible injury to the 
President in any of the above-mentioned cases, but the speech alone was 
found by some lower courts to warrant criminal prosecution.312  
Although the statements were certainly unsettling, if the Court is to be 
believed when it professes a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials,”313 statements like these should not be prosecuted. 
It is cases like these that make a violation of a threat statute the 
“technical offense” that Justice Marshall and the members of Congress 
who debated the threat statutes feared would make “innocent acts 
punishable” and are instances where the Court appears “too anxious to 
convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly.”314 
 310 Id. 
 311 Id. at 1082-83. 
 312 Id. at 1082 (reversing and remanding, because of procedural error, conviction under § 
871); United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming conviction under  § 879); 
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 36 (1975) (reversing Fifth Circuit’s judgment, which had 
affirmed conviction under § 871). 
 313 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 314 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 45-46 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“If you make it a mere technical 
offense, you do not give him much of a chance when he comes to answer before a court and jury.  I 
do not think we ought to be too anxious to convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly . . . .  The 
danger of making § 871 a mere ‘technical offense’ or making ‘innocent acts punishable’ was clear to 
the sponsors of the Act; their concerns should continue to inform the application of the statute 
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V. THE SUBJECTIVE STANDARD IS NECESSARY WHEN ANALYZING 
TRUE THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 
Threats against the President and candidates for the position are 
categorically different from threats against private individuals.  The 
nation has a long history of presidential criticism, and from day one that 
criticism has come in unsettling forms.315  But this is far from a valid 
reason to overzealously insulate the President from such criticism by 
outlawing opinions open to a reasonable interpretation as a threat.  
Holding a person accountable to the possible objective understanding of 
others can only stifle speech where it should flourish.  If the court does 
not allow the true intentions of the speaker to be weighed before he or 
she can be convicted, citizens with legitimate and less threatening 
opinions may be compelled to bite their tongues when the nation could 
learn from their words. 
A. THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS POOR POLICY 
The shortcomings of a solely objective standard are clear.  Too 
often, people who posed no legitimate threat to the President have 
nonetheless been convicted of felonies.  These crimes are not trivial 
citations either, with convictions under both § 871316 and § 879317 
yielding sentences of up to five years in prison.  When applied in some 
of the scenarios discussed above, a violation of the presidential-threat 
statutes amounts to nothing more than a token conviction for the Secret 
Service’s effort.  The objective test imposes a negligence standard on 
speakers, potentially holding them criminally responsible for the effect 
their statements have on listeners outside of their control.318  This alone 
supports a subjective standard for evaluating presidential threats.  With 
an objective standard, a citizen of the United States of America can be 
sentenced to up to five years in prison for making a thoughtless statement 
concerning the President  even if the statement is made without any 
actual intent to commit an act of violence. 
319
today.” (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting 53 CONG. REC. 9378 (1916) (statement of Rep. 
Webb))). 
 315 See discussion supra Introduction. 
 316 18 U.S.C.A. § 871 (Westlaw 2012). 
 317 18 U.S.C.A. § 879 (Westlaw 2012). 
 318 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 47 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 319 18 U.S.C.A. § 871(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully . . . makes any 
such threat against the President, . . . or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of 
President, . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
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Especially in the presidential context, citizens deserve the freedom 
to speak openly and not be constrained by the possible sensitivities of 
others.  There is no free trade of ideas if some unfavored ideas cost a 
criminal conviction.  What one person believes is a true threat another 
may consider nothing more than an alternative method of expressing an 
opinion.  There are justifications for punishing those statements that are 
truly intended to threaten the President and arouse alarm, but these 
justifications lose their strength when statements not intended to do so 
are punished because a group of “reasonable people” found the 
statements discomforting. 
Courts clinging to objective standards repeatedly harp on taking the 
entire context of the statement into account when measuring a 
threatening statement.320  However, failing to take the speaker’s state of 
mind into account leaves a large hole in the factual context of any 
situation.  People far from having the mental faculties necessary to 
account for the potential reaction of those who might hear their 
statements, and even further from posing any threat to the safety of the 
President, have nevertheless been sentenced to prison for what amounts 
to the utterance of mere words.321  Distribution of fliers,322 rants against 
the “establishment,”323 and the ramblings of mentally troubled 
 320 United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Whether a defendant’s 
words constitute a true threat under 18 U.S.C. § 871 must be determined in light of the entire factual 
context of the defendant’s statements.” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th 
Cir. 1987))).  See Strauss, supra note 23, for a thorough discussion of how courts analyze true 
threats in relation to the factual context in which they are made.  Strauss argues that the various true-
threat standards used by courts thus far, subjective or objective, fail under the First Amendment.  
Instead, Strauss “urges the Supreme Court to adopt a declarant-and-recipient-based objective 
standard for threat speech that is flexible enough to take into account the medium through which an 
alleged threat is transmitted.”  Id. at 233.  In place of the traditionally used true threat standards, 
Strauss proposes a “test that considers (1) whether a target is specifically identified; (2) whether a 
reasonable speaker would know that his communication was threatening; and (3) whether a 
reasonable recipient would regard the statement as threatening.  To be compatible with new 
technologies, courts should also integrate a prong that considers (4) whether the identifiable target of 
the communication, using an objective reasonable-person standard, would foreseeably receive the 
threat.”  Id. at 264 (footnotes omitted).  Strauss presents several interesting arguments, based largely 
on a “flexible” analysis of factual context, and in particular, pointing out issues surrounding Internet-
based statements.  Id.  However, Strauss’s proposal concerns the much broader issue of all true 
threats, regardless of at whom they are aimed, not necessarily focusing on the unique concerns 
surrounding threats against the President as this Note does.  Id. 
 321 See United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 767 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming both § 871 and § 
879 convictions of a suicidal inmate under psychiatric supervision); United States v. Crews, 781 
F.2d 826, 832 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (affirming a § 871 conviction of heavily sedated 
psychiatric patient); United States v. Rogers, 488 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) 
(affirming a § 871 conviction of chronic alcoholic), rev’d on other grounds, 422 U.S. 35 (1975). 
 322 Hanna, 293 F.3d at 1082-83. 
 323 United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1361 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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individuals324 have been found to warrant as much as five years in 
federal prison.   This hardly sounds like a civil society premised on 
open political discou
325
B. THE SUBJECTIVE STANDARD IS BETTER BECAUSE OF THE 
SPECIAL STATUS OF THE PRESIDENT 
In contrast, the subjective-intent standard is much more in tune with 
the commands of the First Amendment.  If a “speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,”326 
then he or she certainly deserves punishment for it.  If, however, a 
speaker intends to do no more than voice an unpopular opinion in a crude 
manner, he or she should not be punished for a poor choice of words. 
While some courts have argued that a subjective-intent standard sets 
a bar too high for the government to reach,327 as Judge Reinhardt 
perceptively pointed out in Bagdasarian, the subjective-intent standard 
actually allows more evidence to be introduced because of its relevance 
to the speaker’s state of mind.328  The government would undoubtedly 
want to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gun possession when 
prosecuting presidential true threats, but such evidence would often be 
irrelevant unless the speaker’s state of mind was at issue.329  Regardless, 
making threat convictions easier for the government to obtain far from 
justifies the lower objective standard for presidential threats.  The First 
 324 Crews, 781 F.2d 826. 
 325 Violations of both § 871 and § 879 can be penalized by a fine and/or up to five years in 
prison.  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 871, 879 (Westlaw 2012). 
 326 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 327 See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 328 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Nobody who read the 
message board postings, however, knew that he had a .50 caliber gun or that he would send the later 
emails.  Neither of these facts could therefore, under an objective test, ‘have a bearing on whether 
[Bagdasarian’s] statements might reasonably be interpreted as a threat’ by a reasonable person in the 
position of those who saw his postings on the AIG discussion board.” (citing United States v. Parr, 
545 F.3d 491, 502 (7th Cir. 2008))). 
 329 Id. at 1121-22 (“The Government contends that two additional facts show that 
Bagdasarian’s statements might reasonably be interpreted as a threat.  The first is that when 
Bagdasarian made the statement that Obama ‘will have a 50 cal in the head soon,’ Bagdasarian 
actually had .50 caliber weapons and ammunition in his home.  The second is that on Election Day, 
two weeks after posting the messages, he sent an email that read, ‘Pistol . . . plink plink plink Now 
when you use a 50 cal on a nigga car you get this,’ and linked to a video of debris and two junked 
cars being blown up.  Nobody who read the message board postings, however, knew that he had a 
.50 caliber gun or that he would send the later emails.  Neither of these facts could therefore, under 
an objective test, ‘have a bearing on whether [Bagdasarian’s] statements might reasonably be 
interpreted as a threat’ by a reasonable person in the position of those who saw his postings on the 
AIG discussion board.” (citing Parr, 545 F.3d at 502)). 
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Amendment does not mince words.  “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”330  Even though the courts have 
managed to whittle away at the absolute nature of the First Amendment 
and carve exceptions to its dictates,  that provides no excuse to relax its 
protections when it seems convenient to the Chief Executive.  When 
walking a fine constitutional line, courts should err on the side of 
permitting more to be said. 
331
To many, the President embodies the federal government and the 
politics it represents.  The President stands as the most visible person in 
the American political eye, and when some wish to vent their frustrations 
about governmental policy or personal circumstance, the President is a 
popular target.  It is hard to even imagine many statements by private 
citizens regarding the President that could not in some way be connected 
to politics.332  Even many of Bagdasarian’s racist statements about 
Obama reflect his own, albeit disgusting, political and social 
ideologies.333  In light of the country’s “profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open,” a certain amount of “vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials” must be tolerated.334 
C. THE SECRET SERVICE EXISTS TO PROTECT THE PRESIDENT 
There are clearly unique considerations when threats against the 
President are involved.  “[The] President not only has a personal interest 
in his own security, as does everyone, he also has a public duty not to 
allow himself to be unnecessarily exposed to danger.  A President’s 
death in office has worldwide repercussions and affects the security and 
future of the entire nation.”335  Threats against the President do have 
 330 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 331 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 332 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 333 Several of Bagdasarian’s statements clearly indicate racist sentiments.  For example, 
“shoot the nig country fkd for another 4 years+, what nig has done ANYTHING right? ? ? ? long 
term? ? ? ? never in history, except sambos.”  Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1115. 
 334 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 335 Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Watts v. United States, 402 
F.2d 676, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting), rev’d, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam)). 
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substantially different effects than those aimed at private citizens.  A 
President’s movements and ability to execute his or her duties may be 
impaired by fear of credible threats.   Nevertheless, as the Supreme 
Court in Watts said best, while 
 
336
The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in 
protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to 
perform his duties without interference from threats of physical 
violence[,] . . . a statute such as [§ 871], which makes criminal a form 
of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First 
Amendment clearly in mind.337 
In particular, courts often point out that threats against the President 
may prompt the Secret Service into action when justifying the lower 
threshold of the objective standard.338  A long-standing history of threats 
of violence against the President necessitates the very existence of the 
Secret Service.  However, no legitimate purpose can be served by the 
Secret Service charging a speaker with crimes after investigation reveals 
that he or she poses no threat to the safety of the President beyond 
coarsely worded criticism.  Investigating issues of presidential security is 
chief among the agency’s duties, and by the time potential true threats 
come before the court for analysis, the Secret Service has likely already 
moved on to the next pressing threat to the President. 
While the operating costs of the Secret Service are substantial, no 
court has explained how a different interpretation of true threats would 
lower these costs.  Regardless of the standard used, the Secret Service 
will investigate whatever threats it believes are credible, and there is no 
reason to believe that it investigates only threats that carry a likelihood of 
conviction.  The Secret Service is concerned with protecting the 
President, not conviction rates.  It is unlikely its job will be substantially 
 336 Id. (“[I]f Congress desired to prevent an actual assault upon the President, then it could 
have drafted the statute to make it a crime to assault, attempt to assault, or conspire to assault the 
President.  There would have been no need to direct the statute to threats . . . .  Thus, it appears that 
[§ 871] was designed in part to prevent an evil other than assaults upon the President or incitement to 
assault the President.  It is our view that the other evil is the detrimental effect upon Presidential 
activity and movement that may result simply from a threat upon the President’s life.” (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 64-652 (1916))). 
 337 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 64-652 (1916)). 
 338 See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding the use of an 
objective standard in the specific case of presidential threats: “When that intended recipient is the 
President of the United States, a threat sets in motion an entire army of Secret Service agents and 
law enforcement officials who must investigate the threat, take additional safety precautions to 
protect the President, and in extreme cases, alter the President’s schedule. . . .  In short, we believe 
that section 871 was intended to criminalize the mere utterance of a true threat, rather than the 
defendant’s intention to carry out the threat.”). 
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affected if courts inquire into the subjective state of mind of the speaker 
of a threat before deciding the speaker’s fate. 
Bypassing the commands of the First Amendment cannot be 
justified by the mere possibility that the exercise of free speech may 
inconvenience the Chief Executive.  That amendment unequivocally 
restricts the government from insulating itself from criticism, and it 
applies with the greatest force with respect to the President.  The 
President is the American federal government, in the eyes of many 
citizens.  If the country is to survive as a democracy, it must be in a way 
that all ideas—good and bad—may be freely expressed.  For threats 
against the President, such a dedication to open discourse compels a true-
threat standard that accounts for the subjective intent of the speaker.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bagdasarian implicitly and commendably 
recognizes this notion. 
CONCLUSION: LET SPEECH PREVAIL 
Bagdasarian’s message board posts in the early morning of October 
22, 2008—just weeks before the eventual election of the nation’s first 
black President—were offensive, racist and most of all tasteless, but they 
were not true threats warranting federal prosecution.  As Justice Brennan 
once declared, “[w]hen speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, 
it is easy to find restrictions on them invalid.  But were the First 
Amendment limited to such discourse, our freedom would be sterile 
indeed.”339  As a citizen of the United States, Bagdasarian had the right 
to express even his unfavorable opinions to the same extent that others 
may express their more eloquently worded criticisms. 
The addition of the subjective-intent element to true threats 
recognizes the protections of speech most Americans have likely always 
thought existed, especially for speech about our government and the 
President in particular.  Because of the beloved First Amendment, many 
believe there is little to nothing one can say that would subject them to 
criminal prosecution.  Americans do not take free expression lightly, and 
that sentiment should be reflected in the standards against which the 
nation’s courts measure the words of its citizens. 
Presidential true-threat analysis under a solely objective standard 
removes the speaker from the statement he or she makes and turns the 
words themselves into a potential criminal act.  What a reasonable person 
thinks about a statement concerning the President is no more indicative 
of its meaning than what a foreigner ignorant of the language believes.  
Judges have been spilling ink for decades just trying to interpret words 
 339 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 148 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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like “willfully” and “knowingly.”  It seems nonsensical to hold citizens 
accountable for what others may understand their words to mean if the 
judges and legislatures themselves are incapable of agreeing on 
definitions of words they write into law. 
Precedent has shown that an objective standard produces ridiculous 
results when applied to threats against the President.  Inebriated persons 
and deeply troubled individuals are treated as if they pointed a loaded 
gun right in the President’s face.  Under the objective standard, courts are 
constrained to technical, grammatical analyses that leave little room to 
avoid criminally punishing the utterance of words.  While the words 
themselves are certainly important to the true-threat evaluation, without 
the subjective inquiry, the most important clue as to the meaning of a 
statement—the speaker’s intent behind its making—is wholly absent 
from the analysis. 
 The Ninth Circuit departed from the majority of federal courts’ 
precedents supporting the flawed use of a solely objective standard for 
true threats and moved forward to the more reasonable and 
constitutionally defensible subjective-intent-to-threaten standard. 
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